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THE GENERATIVITY OF SONY V. UNIVERSAL:
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGACY OF
JUSTICE STEVENS
Pamela Samuelson*
INTRODUCTION
United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens is best known in
the intellectual property ("IP") field for his decision for the Court in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. '-his most cited IP
opinion.2 It is also among the most significant IP decisions rendered by the
Court during the three decades of Justice Stevens's tenure there because of
its impact on the copyright and information technology industries.3 While
Sony is known mainly for the safe harbor from copyright challenges that it
established for technologies suitable for substantial non-infringing uses,4
this Article discusses the generativity of the Sony decision,5 that is, the
impact the decision has had in a range of cases presenting very different
facts and legal issues than the Court faced in Sony. This Article asserts that
* Richard M. Sherman Professor of Law and Information Management, University of
California at Berkeley. I am grateful to Abner Greene and his colleagues at Fordham Law
School for organizing an excellent symposium on Justice John Paul Stevens's jurisprudence,
to Alison Watkins and Jennifer Lane for research assistance, and to Microsoft Corp. for its
support for research conducted by scholars of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology.
1. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
2. As of January 22, 2006, Sony had been cited in 500 subsequent court decisions and
1702 law review articles. None of Justice Stevens's other eight intellectual property ("IP")
opinions for the Court has anywhere near this volume of citations. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978), is the next most cited of his IP decisions with citations in sixty-two subsequent
cases and 307 law review articles as of January 22, 2006. The ruling in Flook-that a
computer program algorithm does not become patentable subject matter by adding to the
claim well-known post-solution activity-has been effectively overruled by subsequent
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 Emory L.J.
1025 (1990).
3. The Court decided forty-eight IP cases between 1975 and 2005. Sony was the
twelfth most cited IP decision from this era in subsequent case law and the most widely cited
Supreme Court IP decision in law review literature, as of September 15, 2005. The
significance of Sony for IP law is discussed at length later in this Article. See infra Part III.
4. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; see infra Part II.
5. 1 have borrowed the metaphor of generativity from Jonathan Zittrain. See Jonathan
L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2006). I
acknowledge that my use of this term is distinct from Zittrain's, but I found the term redolent
for the purposes of this Article.
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Sony's generativity is due, in part, to the limited monopoly framework for
analyzing copyright claims articulated by Justice Stevens in Sony. This
framework stands in stark contrast to the proprietarian framework used in
Justice Harry Blackmun's dissent. 6
To put Justice Stevens's Sony opinion in a larger perspective, Part I of
this Article reviews the principal trends in IP law during Justice Stevens's
tenure on the Supreme Court and how the Court's IP decisions from this
period have both contributed to and counteracted these trends. It will set
forth the principal themes of Justice Stevens's IP jurisprudence and discuss
the role he has played in the Court's IP rulings. Perhaps owing to his
background as an antitrust lawyer, 7 Justice Stevens views IP law as a
limited statutory monopoly that must serve the public interest. He is
skeptical of efforts by rights holders to extend their monopolies beyond the
bounds set by the legislature. He takes seriously public policy limitations
on the scope of IP rights and invokes constitutional values such as
promoting public access to knowledge in explaining why IP rights should
be limited in scope and breadth. Part II shows how the limited statutory
monopoly conception of IP law manifested itself in Justice Stevens's
opinion in Sony and sharply contrasts it to Justice Blackmun's dissent. Part
III demonstrates the generativity of the Sony decision, showing its influence
on subsequent cases involving very different fact patterns than Sony.
Software reverse engineers, add-on software developers, Internet service
and access providers, and Internet search engine firms have all relied on
Sony in successfully defending against direct and indirect claims of
copyright infringement. Finally, I conclude that the Sony decision is the
most significant legacy of Justice Stevens in the field of IP law and its
significance is likely to continue in mediating disputes between copyright
industries and creative information technology developers and users of
information technology.
I. IP TRENDS AND THE SUPREME COURT: 1975 TO 2005
Justice John Paul Stevens has served on the United States Supreme Court
since 1975.8 During his thirty-one years on the Court, IP law has become
an increasingly significant form of economic regulation and a prominent
field of law and policy.9 The principal trend during this period has been
6. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 457-500 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also infra Part II.
7. See Wikipedia, John Paul Stevens, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JohnPaulStevens
(last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
8. Id.
9. IP rights have become sufficiently important that membership in the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") is now dependent on nations agreeing to meet minimum standards of
legal protection and enforcement of IP rights. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994). See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property Law in the
International Marketplace, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 275 (1997).
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that IP rights have become stronger and broader.' 0 Although Congress has
been an important actor in strengthening and broadening IP rights," the
Supreme Court has also contributed to this trend. By ruling that genetically
engineered life forms and computer program-related inventions were
patentable, for example, the Court has had profound effects on the U.S.
biotechnology and computer software industries. 12 Authors, trademark
owners, celebrities, and plant breeders have also benefited from Supreme
Court rulings that either expansively interpreted their rights 13 or rejected
defenses aimed at narrowing their rights. 14 This Article refers to decisions
by the Court that strengthened or broadened IP rights or rejected narrow
interpretations of IP rights as "higher" protection decisions.
Yet, interestingly enough, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of IP
rights even more frequently than it has expanded them, particularly in the
last fifteen of these thirty years. 15 A notable example of considerable
economic significance was Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
10. See, e.g., Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for
the Knowledge Society (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Robert P. Merges, One
Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2187
(2000) (discussing various ways in which IP rights have become stronger and broader in the
late twentieth century).
11. In 1998, for example, Congress granted copyright owners new IP rights to control
circumvention of technical measures used to protect copyrighted works and development
and distribution of circumvention technologies. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). And in 1995,
Congress granted trademark owners rights to control dilution of their marks. See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c) (2000).
12. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that a rubber curing process
utilizing a computer program was patentable); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(holding that genetically engineered life forms were patentable subject matters).
13. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that authors
are entitled to control reuse of their articles in the New York Times database); Park 'N Fly,
Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 191 (1985) (noting that an "incontestable"
mark cannot be challenged as too descriptive to qualify for trademark protection).
14. See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) (narrowly construing
a provision allowing farmers to save and sell protected seeds). Particularly noteworthy are
the four occasions in which the Court rejected First Amendment challenges in IP cases. See
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that Congress did not violate the First
Amendment when enacting copyright term extension legislation); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee did
not violate the First Amendment in deciding not to allow a group to use the term "Gay
Olympics" for a sporting event); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985) (holding that a news magazine did not have a First Amendment right to print
excerpts from former President Gerald Ford's memoirs); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment did not immunize a TV
broadcaster from publicity rights claims by a performer).
15. From 1975 to 1990, the Court adopted a higher protection rule more frequently than
a lower protection rule. (By my reckoning, thirteen cases adopted a higher protection rule,
while seven adopted a lower protection rule, and three cases cannot be understood in these
terms.) Between 1990 and 2005, however, the Court has more frequently ruled for the lower
protection rule. (By my reckoning, the Court has ruled in favor of a lower protection
position in sixteen cases in the past fifteen years, while a higher protection rule was adopted
in seven cases; four cases cannot be understood in these terms.) Totaling the cases, I count
twenty higher protection decisions and twenty-three lower protection decisions among the
forty-eight IP decisions rendered by the Court in this period.
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Service, in which the Supreme Court ruled that white pages listings of
telephone directories lacked sufficient originality to qualify for copyright
protection. 16 The Register of Copyrights characterized Feist as having
"'dropped a bomb"' on U.S. copyright law 17 because it upset settled
expectations of publishers of directories and databases who had long relied
on "sweat of the brow" copyright case law. 18
Numerous other rulings by the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
patent and trade dress rights or made them more vulnerable to challenges.' 9
In five of the seven cases construing statutory exceptions or limitations on
IP rights, such as the fair use provision,20 the Court gave a more expansive
interpretation to the exception than the IP claimant had hoped. 21 This
Article speaks of decisions that narrowed IP rights or construed exceptions
or limitations more broadly than IP claimants had wanted as "lower"
protection decisions.
Justice Stevens has played an active role in the Court's IP jurisprudence
during these years. He wrote opinions in twenty-one of the forty-eight IP
cases decided by the Court during these three decades: 22 seven for the
16. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). Feist is the third most
frequently cited of the Supreme Court's IP decisions in the past thirty years and the second
most frequently cited case in the law review literature.
17. See Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 607, 607 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (holding that a
reverse telephone directory is infringing).
19. See, e.g., Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (noting that
trademark dilution requires a showing of harm to the trademark); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (noting that prosecution history
estoppel limits the scope of claims); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23 (2001) (denying a trade dress claim because of a prior patent on a functional design);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (narrowing the
doctrine of equivalents in patent infringement cases).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
21. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (construing
the experimental use exception); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111 (2004) (holding that the burden of proof on a trademark fair use issue was on
the trademark owner); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135 (1998) (holding that the first-sale doctrine limited the scope of an importation right);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that a rap parody version
of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman" was a fair use); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding personal use copying of programs from broadcast
TV to be fair use; and that there is no secondary liability based on the sale of technology
with substantial non-infringing uses). The two decisions in which the higher protection
interpretation of an exception or limitation on IP rights was upheld are Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995) (construing a farmer seed sale privilege narrowly), and
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding no fair
use exception for publication of excerpts from forthcoming presidential memoirs).
22. Seventeen of the forty-eight IP decisions were patent cases, sixteen were copyright
cases, twelve were trademark cases, and five involved other claims (such as rights of
publicity, antitrust, or plant variety protection). Twenty-seven of these cases (or 56%) were
decided unanimously, seventeen of which favored the lower protection position. Of the
twenty-eight IP cases it has heard in the past fifteen years, the Court has been unanimous in
nineteen (or 68%). If one excludes the Florida Prepaid cases (on grounds that they are more
federalism than IP cases), the unanimous rate in the past fifteen years rises to 73%. Yet, the
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Court,23 three concurrences, 24 and eleven dissents. 25 No Justice in the past
thirty years has come close to writing as many opinions in IP cases as
Justice Stevens. 26
next most common vote pattern in the Court's IP decisions during Justice Stevens's tenure
was 5-4 splits (17%). Justice Stevens dissented in five of the eight cases during these years
in which there was a 5-4 split. Three other cases were 8-1 splits. Justice Stevens was the
lone dissenter in all three. Of the four cases involving 7-2 splits, Justice Stevens dissented in
three. Yet of the five cases involving 6-3 splits, he dissented in only one of them. Justice
Stephen Breyer has been a fellow dissenter of Justice Stevens in seven of the eight split vote
cases in the past fifteen years. For the purposes of this Article, a case was included as an IP
case if it involved interpretation of IP law, legislative history about an IP law, or IP policy.
For example, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979), is, strictly speaking, an antitrust case, but since it discusses copyright law and policy
at some length, I include it as a copyright case. Similarly, the Florida Prepaid cases are
included as respectively patent and trademark rulings because they considered congressional
deliberations about whether states should have immunity from patent and trademark damage
awards by federal courts. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. (Florida Prepaid II), 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding states immune from trademark
infringement damage awards); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank (Florida Prepaid 1), 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding states immune from patent
infringement damage awards). The Court was also evenly split in two cases-both involving
computer programs-and consequently affirmed lower court rulings without setting
precedent. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 140 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that copyright protection for computer programs did not extend to command hierarchy of
user interface), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); In re Bradley, 600
F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (holding a computer program data structure to be patentable), aff'd
by an equally divided Court sub nom., Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981). Based on
my assessment of his pro-competition policy stance in other IP cases, I believe that Justice
Stevens, who recused himself in the latter case, would have voted to affirm the First
Circuit's decision had he participated in deliberations in the Lotus case. He would also have
been among the four "no" votes in the Bradley case. See infra notes 30-60 and
accompanying text.
23. Stevens's decisions for the Court, in the order in which they were decided, were:
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding a computer program innovation not to be
patentable); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (holding
that a sale of technology with substantial non-infringing use qualified for the safe harbor
from copyright infringement lawsuits); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985);
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993); Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International, Inc., 523 -U.S. 135; Pfaff v. Wells
Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418.
24. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S.
648 (1983). Although his opinion in the Broadcast Music case was a partial concurrence, it
was mainly a dissent so I have counted it among his dissents.
25. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.
483 (2001); Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid 1, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207 (1990); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985); Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
26. Of the other Justices on the Court, the next most prolific in IP cases has been Justice
Antonin Scalia who wrote seven IP opinions for the Court, four concurrences, and one
dissent. Yet, two of Justice Scalia's opinions for the Court were in the Florida Prepaid
cases which are more reflective of the Court's federalism jurisprudence than its IP
20061 1835
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Like Justice William 0. Douglas whom he succeeded, 27 Justice Stevens
has been among the most consistent IP "minimalists" on the Court.28
Indeed, the only two cases in which Justice Stevens would have granted
more extensive IP protection than a majority of the Court were the Florida
Prepaid cases which considered whether states were immune from damage
lawsuits for patent or trademark infringement. 29 To lay the groundwork for
articulating characteristic themes of Justice Stevens's IP jurisprudence, the
remainder of this part will discuss five opinions in which he explained why
certain computer program-related inventions were not patentable, why an
inventor who predisclosed his invention to a prospective purchaser lost
patent protection for it, why makers of shampoo lacked the right to control
importations of bottles with copyrighted labels, why firms -adopting
descriptive names for their services should not be eligible for
jurisprudence. In her twenty-four years on the Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote
six opinions for the Court in IP cases, one concurrence, and no dissents.
27. Among Justice William 0. Douglas's decisions that are fairly characterized as lower
protection decisions are: Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding an algorithm for
transforming numbers from binary coded decimals to pure binary form to be unpatentable);
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (striking patent as invalid);
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (endorsing a
"flash of creative genius" standard for inventions).
28. By IP "minimalists," I mean Justices who tend to vote for the lower protection
position in IP cases coming before the Court. For a discussion of lower and higher
protection IP decisions, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. The only respect in
which Justice Stevens has not been as much of an IP minimalist as Justice Douglas has been
in his reactions to First Amendment defenses in the four IP cases that raised them. See
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (holding that Congress did not violate the First Amendment when
enacting copyright term extension legislation); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee did not violate the
First Amendment in deciding not to allow a group to use the term "Gay Olympics" for a
sporting event); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(holding that a news magazine did not have a First Amendment right to print excerpts from
Gerald Ford's forthcoming memoirs); Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562 (holding that the First
Amendment did not immunize a TV broadcaster from publicity rights claims by a
performer). Although Justice Stevens dissented in Zacchini, he did so on grounds that the
Ohio courts should have an opportunity to clarify the basis of their ruling, not on First
Amendment grounds, id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting), as Justice Lewis Powell's
dissent did, id at 579-82 (Powell, J., dissenting). His dissent in Eldred would have struck
down the Copyright Term Extension Act as unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, of the Constitution, not under the First Amendment. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222-23
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas would have been more receptive than Justice
Stevens to the First Amendment defenses, especially in the San Francisco Arts & Athletics
and Harper & Row cases.
29. A majority of the Court in these cases ruled that the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution precluded lawsuits against state entities for patent or trademark infringement.
See Florida Prepaid 1, 527 U.S. 627; Florida Prepaid 11, 527 U.S. 666. Justice Stevens
would have upheld the rights of patentees and trademark owners to sue in federal court for
monetary relief against state entity infringers. See Florida Prepaid I, 527 U.S. at 649
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Florida Prepaid II, 527 U.S. at 691-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The literature on the Supreme Court's federalism decisions and its controversial
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment has been explored in an extensive literature, to
which this Symposium contributes. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with
Federalism: If It's Not Just a Battle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74
Fordham L. Rev. 2081 (2006).
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"incontestable" status for the names as trademarks, and why Congress
should not have the power to extend the terms of existing IP rights.
Justice Stevens's first IP opinion for the Court was Parker v. Flook,
which held a computer program-related invention to be unpatentable. 30
Flook relied heavily on Justice Douglas's opinion for a unanimous Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson31 that decided that an algorithm for transforming
binary coded decimals to pure binary form was not a patentable process.
Benson "[r]eason[ed] that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a
law of nature, [and] applied the established rule that a law of nature cannot
be the subject of a patent."'32 Justice Stevens regarded this ruling as sound,
saying in Flook that "[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle
into a patentable process exalts form over substance. '33 Three years later,
Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent when a majority of the Court
decided, by a 5-4 vote, that process claims for computer program-related
innovations should be viewed as a whole. This decision upheld the
patentability of a rubber-curing process, the only novel element of which
was a computer program that continuously calculated temperatures inside
the mold.34
30. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
31. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
32. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
33. Id. at 590. "A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity
to almost any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been
patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step
indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying
techniques." Id.
34. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Stevens gave
three reasons why I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that Diehr and Lutton
claim to have discovered a new method of constantly measuring the temperature
inside a mold. First, there is not a word in the patent application that suggests that
there is anything unusual about the temperature-reading devices used in this
process-or indeed that any particular species of temperature-reading device
should be used in it. Second, since devices for constantly measuring actual
temperatures-on a back porch, for example-have been familiar articles for quite
some time, I find it difficult to believe that a patent application filed in 1975 was
premised on the notion that a process of constantly measuring the actual
temperature had just been discovered. Finally, the Patent and Trademark Office
Board of Appeals expressly found that the only difference between the
conventional methods of operating a molding press and that claimed in [the]
application rests in those steps of the claims which relate to the calculation
incident to the solution of the mathematical problem or formula used to control the
mold heater and the automatic opening of the press. This finding was not
disturbed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and is clearly correct.
Id. at 207-08 (internal quotations omitted). Yet, Justice Stevens was not a knee-jerk low
protectionist as to patentable subject matter, for he voted with a majority of the Court when
it ruled, also by a 5-4 vote, that genetically engineered life forms were patentable subject
matter over an objection that Congress had not contemplated life forms as patentable subject
matter. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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All of the other decisions Justice Stevens wrote for the Court were, like
Flook, cases in which the lower protection position prevailed.35 Pfaff v.
Wells Electronics, Inc.36 and Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L 'Anza
Research International, Inc.37 are characteristic. Pfaff interpreted a patent
law provision requiring inventors to file for patent protection within a year
of engaging in certain activities such as selling products embodying the
invention.38 Pfaff disclosed his invention to Texas Instruments ("TI") more
than a year before his patent application in the hope that TI would order
products embodying the invention. Pfaff argued that his invention was not
complete until it was reduced to practice several months after this
disclosure, and so his patent filing fell within the one-year grace period.
The Court unanimously decided that Pfaff's invention was substantially
complete when he accepted an order from TI shortly after the disclosure,
which resulted in invalidating the patent. Justice Stevens characterized this
patent rule as "a limiting provision ... [intended to] confin[e] the duration
of the monopoly to the statutory term," 39 that served the public "interest in
avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition." 40  Wells
Electronics was one of the competitors entitled to practice the invention
because of Pfaff's unjustified delay in filing the patent.
Quality King raised the question of whether copyright law's exclusive
right to control importation of protected works was limited by copyright's
first sale rule.41 The Court unanimously concluded that it was. Justice
Stevens wrote, "The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the
copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by
selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its
distribution. '42 Justice Stevens pointed out that Quality King was "an
unusual copyright case" because the defendant was charged with copyright
infringement not because it had copied L'Anza's copyrighted work-in this
case, labels for bottles of shampoo-but only because it had imported the
35. Some might argue that Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985), was not a
lower protection decision. I believe it was because it rejected an authors' rights argument for
greater legal protection. The case involved a dispute between a music publisher and the
heirs of a composer about the distribution of income generated from a sound recording
created prior to the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976. The 1976 Act allowed authors or
their heirs to terminate previous transfers, such as Snyder's assignment of copyright in the
musical work "Who's Sorry Now?" to Mills. Snyder's heirs argued that the termination of
transfer provision was intended to benefit authors and they should, therefore, be able to get
royalties received by Mills. The Court decided that a termination of transfer did not affect
the contractual rights of owners of copyrights in authorized derivative works and publishers
such as Mills. Justice Stevens dissented from a pro-authors' rights decision of the Court in
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), on a similar question.
36. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
37. 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
38. See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 57 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
39. Id. at 64.
40. Id. at 63.
41. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138 (statement of question presented); see 17 U.S.C. §§
106, 109, 602 (2000).
42. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152.
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shampoo lawfully purchased abroad.43  Justice Stevens observed that
"L'Anza is primarily interested in protecting the integrity of its method of
marketing the products to which the labels are affixed. '44 This was not the
kind of interest copyright law was intended to protect.
On three occasions, Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter for lower
protectionist positions. 45 In Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly,
Inc.,46 for example, Justice Stevens took issue with the Court's conclusion
that a descriptive mark should be insulated from challenge once it had
obtained "incontestable" status. 47 Trademark law did not define this term,
he noted, and in at least twenty situations, an "incontestable" mark could, in
fact, be contested. 48 "There is a well-recognized public interest," he said,
"in prohibiting the commercial monopolization of phrases such as 'park and
fly.' ' 49 Such language, he added, "belongs to the public unless Congress
instructs otherwise," 50 which he believed it had not on this issue.
One of Justice Stevens's most impassioned lower protectionist opinions
is his dissent from the Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA") in Eldred v. Ashcroft.5 1 Web-
43. Id. at 140.
44. Id. L'Anza sold shampoo and other hair products in the U.S. exclusively to beauty
salons and the like who agreed to resell them within designated areas. It sold the same goods
outside the U.S. at prices 35-40% lower than in the U.S. Quality King purchased L'Anza's
products in Malta and shipped them back to the U.S. and sold them to supermarkets and drug
stores at lower prices than those offered by beauty salons.
45. The other two cases were Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), and Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). In
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25-38, Justice Stevens would have upheld the broadcasters'
antitrust claim against copyright collectives with market power who had refused to offer
alternative modes than blanket licensing. "The ASCAP system requires users to buy more
music than they want at a price which .. may well be far higher than what they would
choose to spend for music in a competitive system." Id. at 31-32. "Our cases have
repeatedly stressed the need to limit the privileges conferred by patent and copyright strictly
to the scope of the statutory grant." Id. at 37. In Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 193-95, Justice Stevens
would have permitted farmers such as Winterboer to gather seeds from crops grown from
protected seeds and sell these seeds to other farmers as long as they didn't "market" them.
"The statute as a whole ... indicates that Congress intended to preserve the farmer's right to
engage in so-called 'brown-bag sales' of seed to neighboring farmers." Id. at 194. His
reading of the statute was "consistent with our time-honored practice of viewing restraints on
the alienation of property with disfavor," and with the first sale rule of patent and copyright
law. Id. Justice Stevens also dissented in three of the four cases with a 7-2 split, in all of
which he favored the "low" protection position.
46. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
47. Id. at 206-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Trademark law permits a firm that registers a
trademark with the U.S Patent and Trademark Office to file an affidavit attesting to the
continuous use of the mark for five years without an adverse finding as to the claim of
ownership in the mark to attain incontestable status for the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)
(2000).
48. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 214-15.
50. Id. at 215.
51. 537 U.S. 186. 222-42 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Section I of this dissent relies
heavily on the Court's patent jurisprudence, in part because the strongest expressions of
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based publisher Eric Eldred challenged the retroactive grant of twenty
additional years of exclusive rights for copyrights in existing works,
arguing that the Constitution forbids a grant of exclusive rights without a
quid pro quo of a newly original work to justify it; Eldred also argued that
the lengthened copyright terms were virtually perpetual in violation of the
"limited times" provision of the Constitution. 52
In Justice Stevens's view, the "limited [t]imes" requirement "serves the
ultimate purpose of promoting the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts' by
guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the public domain as soon as
the period of exclusivity expires."' 53 Public access to creative work is, in his
view, "the ultimate purpose" of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. 54
Consequently, members of the public, such as Eldred, "were entitled to rely
on a promised access to copyrighted or patented works at the expiration of
the terms specified when the exclusive privileges were granted. 55
Retroactive extension of IP rights serves "[n]either the purpose of
encouraging new [innovations] nor the overriding interest in advancing
progress by adding knowledge to the public domain." 56 The Court's ruling
treated "the public interest in free access to copyrighted works [as] entirely
worthless" 57 and gave authors a "windfall solely based on completed
creative activity. ' 58  The Court's reasoning would permit perpetual
copyrights as long as copyright terms were extended whenever they were
about to expire. "By failing to protect the public interest in free access to
the products of inventive and artistic genius-indeed, by virtually ignoring
the central purpose of the Copyright/Patent Clause-the Court has quit-
claimed to Congress its principal responsibility in this area of the law."'59
From these and others of his decisions, several themes of Justice
Stevens's IP jurisprudence are evident. Most evident is his characterization
of IP rights as limited statutory monopolies, which must carefully balance
the interests of innovators and those of the public. When Congress has not
clearly expressed its intent to extend protection as far as a plaintiff would
like, Justice Stevens tends to construe the monopoly right narrowly because
of the impacts that broad rulings will have on competition, commerce, and
public access to knowledge. Justice Stevens takes statutory limitations on
exclusive rights of IP owners seriously and considers the impact of the
Court's ruling on the public's interests, as well as on the parties to the
lawsuits. Many of his decisions invoke the Copyright/Patent Clause (as he
constitutional limits on Congress's power and of the quid pro quo conception of grants of IP
rights (disclosure of the invention to the public as the quid pro quo for patent). Id. at 223-27.
52. See Brief for Petitioners, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf.
53. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 224.
55. Id. at 240.
56. Id. at 226.
57. Id. at 241.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 242.
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calls it) or constitutional values as important influences in the interpretive
process. Yet, his decisions are informed by more than just the statutory
language, legislative history, prior rulings, and constitutional theory; they
are also grounded in practical realities. Nowhere are these themes more
evident than in Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Sony v.
Universal.60
II. SONY V. UNIVERSAL
The first U.S. copyright case to challenge the sale of a technology
designed for use to make copies of copyrighted works was initiated by
Universal City Studios against Sony Corp. in 1976. Universal claimed that
Sony sold Betamax machines, knowing or having reason to know that its
customers would use these machines to make unauthorized copies of
copyrighted programs, including those produced by Universal and its co-
plaintiff Disney, in violation of the exclusive right of copyright owners to
control the reproduction of their works.61 Sony's ads promoted the use of
Betamax to "record [your] favorite shows" and "build a library," 62 and
survey evidence showed that the primary use of Betamax machines was to
make copies of programs for time-shifting purposes. 63 The evidence also
showed that more than forty percent of Betamax users had built libraries of
programs taped from broadcast television. 64
Sony defended this lawsuit by asserting that its Betamax machines had
many non-infringing uses, including copying programs whose copyright
owners did not object and copying public domain materials. 65 It also
argued that time-shift copying was a fair use and that Congress had
intended to exempt private use home taping from radio or TV from claims
of copyright infringement. 66  Sony argued that the non-infringing
capabilities of Betamax should, as in patent law, insulate Sony from claims
of contributory infringement. 67
60. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000); Sony, 464 U.S. at 420. For a highly readable and
informative account of this lawsuit, see James Lardner, Fast Forward: A Machine and the
Commotion It Caused (rev. ed. 2002), and for an engaging account of the Supreme Court's
deliberations, see Jessica Litman, Sony v. Universal: Mary Poppins Meets the Boston
Strangler, in Intellectual Property Stories 358 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
62. Sony, 464 U.S. at 459 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 423.
64. Id. at 483 n.35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 443-47 (discussing authorized and unobjectionable uses).
66. Id. at 447-56 (discussing the fair use argument for time shifting). Justice Stevens's
opinion for the Court does not discuss the implied exemption for the private copying defense
on which the trial court had ruled for Sony.
67. Id. at 439-42 (discussing the staple article of commerce limitation on contributory
infringement in patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982)).
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In 1979, after a five-week trial, the trial court ruled in Sony's favor. 68 In
1981, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.69
It disputed the appropriateness of importing patent law's "staple article of
commerce" rule into copyright law, 70 and held that time-shift copying of
televised movies constituted infringement because such copying was a
consumptive, rather than a productive, use of the copyrighted work.71
Because the primary use of Betamax machines was to facilitate copyright
infringement and Sony knew that its customers were making infringing
copies of copyrighted works, the Ninth Circuit held Sony responsible for
these infringements. 72 The Supreme Court accepted Sony's petition for
certiorari in 1982.73 The Court heard oral arguments in the Sony case in
two separate terms, and finally issued its ruling in favor of Sony, by a 5-4
vote, in 1984. 74
Much is now known about the Court's deliberations in this case because
over the years, papers of some Justices have become publicly accessible. 75
At the Court's first conference on the case, the expectation was that Justice
Blackmun would be writing a majority opinion upholding the Ninth
Circuit.76 After Justice Stevens circulated a draft dissent explaining why he
believed that making a single copy of a television program in the privacy of
one's home is not infringement, 77 some Justices became receptive to the
argument that time shifting was a fair use.78 Justice Stevens made a
number of changes to his opinion in response to concerns expressed by
other Justices.79 His revised opinion eventually attracted support from
68. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
69. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
70. Id. at 975.
71. Id. at 971-72.
72. Id. at 975-76. The Ninth Circuit recognized that designing a proper remedy would
be difficult and complex, but remanded the case to the lower court to decide upon a remedy.
Id. at 976-77.
73. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 457 U.S. 1116 (1982).
74. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Sony is one
of the rare cases in which the Court heard oral argument twice. The Court was deeply split
about the case, and considerable negotiations among the Justices and redrafting to try to
accommodate differing perspectives occurred during the first Term in which the case was
heard, so the Court put the case over for reargument, although not rebriefing. See Litman,
supra note 61, at 366-79 (describing the oral arguments and exchanges among the Justices).
75. See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek
Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 427
(1993); Litman, supra note 61, at 367-68 (discussing the insights gleaned from a review of
Justice Blackmun's papers).
76. Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 917, 930 (2005).
77. Steven's memorandum stated that "[i]t would plainly be unconstitutional to prohibit
a person from singing a copyrighted song in the shower or jotting down a copyrighted poem
he hears on the radio." Id. at 933.
78. Id. at 932-40.
79. Id. Justice O'Connor thought fair use was appropriate in the absence of harm and
supported language in the opinion about the staple article of commerce rule. Justice Brennan
was willing to agree that time-shift copying was fair use, although not library copying. Id.
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Justices William Brennan, Sandra Day O'Connor, Warren Burger, and
Byron White.80 Justices Thurgood Marshall, Lewis Powell, and William
Rehnquist joined what became Justice Blackmun's dissent.81 The Stevens
majority and Blackmun dissenting opinions are notable not simply for their
differing interpretations of the legal issues presented by the case, but also
for the very different frameworks they employ for analyzing copyright
issues.
Justice Stevens began his analysis in Sony with Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, of the Constitution which gives Congress the power "[t]o
"Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings... ."82 The opinion next observed that "[t]he monopoly
privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. '83 The primary objective in
granting authors and inventors a limited monopoly in their innovations is
not to reward them for what they have produced, but to induce them to
provide the public with "appropriate access to their work product."'84 The
task for Congress is to formulate a "difficult balance between the interests
of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the free
flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand."'85
While copyright law had evolved over time in response to new
technologies, 86 a "recurring theme" of the Court's jurisprudence in new
technology cases has been "[t]he judiciary's reluctance to expand the
protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative
guidance." 87 After citing several cases in which the Court had rejected
arguments for expansive protection when new technologies posed legal
questions not contemplated by the legislature, 88 the Sony opinion went on to
say that "[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials." 89 The reason was simple: "Congress
80. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
81. Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 428.
83. Id. at 429 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158
(1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 430.
87. Id. at431.
88. Id; Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (cable
TV redistribution of broadcast signals was not a public performance of copyrighted
programs); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (same);
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (piano rolls not "copies" of
sheet music); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopying service for researchers not
copyright infringement).
89. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
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has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
implicated by such new technology." 90
The next part begins with the observation that copyright law "does not
expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another." 9 1
As Justice Stevens explains, however, the Court had upheld an indirect
liability claim in Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. as to the producer of "an
unauthorized film dramatization of the copyrighted book Ben Hur... for
his sale of the motion picture to jobbers, who in turn arranged for the
commercial exhibition of the film."'92 Universal argued that "Kalem stands
for the proposition that supplying the 'means' to accomplish an infringing
activity and encouraging that activity through advertisement are sufficient
to establish liability for copyright infringement. '93 This was, Justice
Stevens opined, a "gross generalization that cannot withstand scrutiny." 94
Sony, after all, was not supplying infringing copies of copyrighted works to
users of its Betamax machines. While it may be "manifestly just" to
impose secondary liability upon a person who is "in a position to control the
use of copyrighted works by others and . . . authorized the use without
permission from the copyright owner," the Sony case "d[id] not fall in that
category." 95
Sony could only be held liable on the theory "that it has sold equipment
with constructive knowledge that its customers may use that equipment to
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material."'96 There was, however,
"no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of [secondary]
liability on such a theory," 97 nor any basis in the copyright statute. Holding
Sony liable on this theory would, Justice Stevens recognized, have
significant impacts on other parties besides Universal, including copyright
owners who favored use of Betamax machines to make time-shift copying
of their programs, members of the public who wanted access to these
technologies to make authorized and fair uses of them, and, of course, Sony
and other technology developers who wanted to make and sell these
technologies. 98 "When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated
entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser
to infringe [an IP right], the public interest in access to that article of
commerce is necessarily implicated." 99 By the time the Court heard oral
90. Id.
91. Id. at 434.
92. Id. at 435 (discussing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
93. Id. at 436.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 437-38.
96. Id. at 439.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 434-42. The Court pointed out that "copying of the respondents' programs
represents a small portion of the total use of [videotape recorders ("VTR's")]." Id. at 434.
99. Id. at 440.
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argument again in Sony for the second time, 9.5 million American
households had Betamax machines. 100
Justice Stevens observed that Congress had resolved a similar tension in
patent law by providing that contributory liability could only be imposed on
a technology developer when it makes and sells a device that has been
"especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of [a]
patent."'' Sales of staple articles of commerce, that is, technologies that
are "suitable for substantial non-infringing use," are exempt from
contributory liability in patent law.'0 2 The public has a legitimate interest
in having access to staple articles of commerce in order to enjoy them for
their non-infringing uses.
Justice Stevens characterized as "extraordinary" Universal's suggestion
that "the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright owners collectively,
much less [on Universal and its co-plaintiff Disney], the exclusive right to
distribute videotape recorders ("VTR's") simply because they may be used
to infringe copyrights." 10 3 This would stretch the limited monopoly granted
in the Copyright Act beyond its statutory bounds. 10 4 The Sony decision
recognized that Congress had decided that selling staple articles of
commerce should not constitute contributory patent infringement and
concluded that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles
of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes."' 1 5  Indeed, Sony
stated, "it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses."106
Stevens's opinion then turned to whether the Betamax had and was
capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Sony had produced evidence
that many copyright owners did not object to time-shift copying of their
programs and some had authorized time shifting. 10 7 But the Sony opinion
went on to explain why a majority of the Court concluded unauthorized
time shifting was fair use.10 8 This use was fair, Sony opined, because it was
private and noncommercial; because it merely allowed someone to watch at
100. Counsel for Sony led off his oral argument with this fact. Litman, supra note 76, at
940. The potential for statutory damages for which owners of Betamax machines might be
liable if Universal's theory was accepted was staggeringly large. Justice Stevens was
concerned about the potential for statutory damages against individuals. Id. at 930.
101. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
102. Id. For an informative discussion of the case law on the staple article of commerce
rule, see 5 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 17.04 (2004) [hereinafter Chisum on
Patents].
103. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 n.21. By asking for injunctive relief, Universal sought to gain
effective control over the sale of VTRs and to "declare [them] contraband." Id.
104. The Court recognized that "a finding of contributory infringement is normally the
functional equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the monopoly granted to
the [rightsholder]." Id. at 441.
105. Id. at 442.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 442-47. These non-infringing uses of Betamaxes constituted approximately
ten percent of its uses. Id. at 443. The Court did not make clear whether these authorized
uses alone met the substantial non-infringing use test.
108. Id. at 447-56.
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a later time a program he/she was welcome to view for free; because
although home taping copied whole programs, 109 users commonly taped
over programs after viewing them; 10 and because Universal had stipulated
that it had not yet suffered any harm, and evidence of future harm was, in
the Court's view, "speculative.""'I
Sony announced that private noncommercial copying of copyrighted
materials should be presumed fair (thereby shifting the burden of proof of
unfairness to the copyright owner), l 12 and second, that copyright owners
had to prove that "the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the
copyrighted work," or that "some meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists."'' 3  Prohibiting noncommercial uses that had "no demonstrable
effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted
work.., would merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing
benefit."114
The Sony opinion concluded with this trenchant observation:
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day
have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or
have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make
such copying possible. 115
Congress may well "take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so
often has examined other innovations in the past." 116 But having found no
basis in the copyright statute "as it now reads," the Ninth Circuit's ruling
"must be reversed."" 17
Justice Blackmun's dissent is strikingly different in structure and tone
from Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority. Blackmun's starting point
was the congressional grant to copyright owners of an exclusive right to
control reproductions of their works in copies. 118 Even a single copy could
infringe this exclusive right. 19 Congress had considered and rejected the
109. Id. at 451-53.
110. Id. at 453 n.39.
111. Id. at 454.
112. Id. at 449. The Court also announced that "every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege" and that "[i]f the
intended use is for commercial gain, [the] likelihood [of harm] may be presumed." Id. at
451. The commercial presumptions were endorsed in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), but eventually repudiated by the Court in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
113. Sony, 464 U.S. at 451.
114. Id. at 450-51.
115. Id. at456.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at463.
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idea of creating an exception for private noncommercial copies, 120 so unless
a private copy qualified as a fair use, it was an infringement. 12 1
Justice Blackmun explained at considerable length why he believed time
shifting did not qualify as a fair use.122 Fair use was, he argued, intended to
permit productive uses of existing works, such as scholarly quotations from
preexisting works, but not for ordinary consumptive uses, such as watching
a program at a later time. 123  Scholars and other productive users of
copyrighted works contributed new knowledge that justified the "subsidy"
that fair use imposed on authors. 124 "There is no indication that the fair use
doctrine has any application for purely personal consumption on the scale
involved in this case .... -125
Most time shifting was, moreover of entertainment programs, not news
or informational works, which cut against fair use. 126 The amount and
substantiality of the copying was, in Justice Blackmun's view, "even more
devastating to the Court's interpretation"'127 because time shifting typically
involved copying whole programs. In his view, copying of entire works
"might alone be sufficient to preclude a finding of fair use." 128
Blackmun's dissent was especially critical of Stevens's opinion for
failing to consider "the effect of the [challenged] use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work," 129 as the fair use provision
directed. In Justice Blackmun's view, a prospective fair user "cannot
prevail merely by demonstrating that the copyright holder suffered no net
harm from [his] action[s]"; indeed, "even a showing that the infringement
has resulted in a net benefit to the copyright holder will not suffice."' 130 To
prevail, the fair use claimant "must demonstrate that he had not impaired
the copyright holder's ability to demand compensation from (or to deny
access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to see or hear
the copyrighted work."' 131 Universal had identified "a number of ways in
which VTR recording could damage their copyrights,"'132 and had shown
120. Id. at 465-66.
121. Id. at 464-65. "When Congress intended special and protective treatment for private
use," Justice Blackmun said, "it said so explicitly," id at 468, as it had done in limiting the
exclusive performance right to control over public performances and in permitting certain
copies to be made by libraries. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 108 (2000).
122. Justice Blackmun's dissent also contains a lengthy discussion of the implied private
copying exemption argument that had persuaded the district court. Sony, 464 U.S. at 470-75
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court did not address this issue.
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (discussed in Sony, 464 U.S. at 477-81 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
124. Sony, 464 U.S. at 478-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 495. Justice Blackmun was "aware of no case in which the reproduction of a
copyrighted work for the sole benefit of the user has been held to be fair use." Id. at 479.
126. Id. at 496-97.
127. Id. at 497.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000)).
130. Id. at 485.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 483.
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harm to a new potential market consisting of those persons who "are willing
to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted [programs] at their
convenience." 13 3
Turning to contributory infringement, the Blackmun dissent observed
that "[f]rom [Universal's] perspective, the consequences of home VTR
recording are the same as if a business had taped [its] works off the air,
duplicated the tapes, and sold or rented them to members of the public for
home viewing." 134 Neither "formal control over the infring[er]" nor "actual
knowledge of particular instances of infringement"' 135 was necessary to
establish contributory liability in Justice Blackmun's view. Constructive
knowledge of infringement sufficed, 136 and "Sony had reason to know the
Betamax would be used by some owners to tape copyrighted works off the
air." 137 Indeed, Sony's ads encouraged them to do so. 13 8
Justice Blackmun regarded the staple article rule of patent law to be
"based in part on considerations irrelevant to the field of copyright," and so
it should not "be imported wholesale into copyright law."' 139 Yet, he
recognized that "many of the concerns underlying the 'staple article of
commerce' doctrine are present in copyright as well.' 40 For him, the
question was whether "virtually all of the product's use ... is to infringe"
or whether "a significant portion of the product's use is non-infringing."'141
Justice Blackmun would have sent Sony back to the lower courts for more
precise findings about the relative proportions of infringing and non-
infringing uses of Betamax machines. 142
The concluding parts of Justice Blackmun's dissent contain some
stinging indictments of the majority opinion. It criticized the Court for
"dramatically [altering] the doctrines of fair use and contributory
infringement as they have been developed by Congress."' 143 The decision
"erodes much of the coherence that these doctrines have struggled to
achieve." 144  Justice Blackmun also criticized the majority opinion for
"confus[ing] the question of liability with the difficulty of fashioning an
appropriate remedy."'1 45 He believed it was possible to accommodate the
concerns of broadcasters who supported time-shift copying by ordering
133. Id. at 485. That such persons were willing to pay was "evidenced by the fact that
they are willing to pay for VTR's ar.d tapes." Id.
134. Id. at 486.
135. Id. at 487-88 (citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971), for the first proposition and Screen Gems-Columbia
Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), for the second).
136. Id. at 488.
137. Id. at 489.
138. Id. at 489-90.
139. Id. at 491.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 493.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 494.
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Sony to pay a royalty to copyright owners or "Sony may be able.., to
build a VTR that enables broadcasters to scramble the signal of individual
programs and 'jam' the unauthorized recording of them."'146 The majority's
willingness to allow manufacturers to escape liability if their technologies
were capable of substantial non-infringing uses "essentially eviscerates the
concept of contributory infringement," for "[o]nly the most unimaginative
manufacturer would be unable to demonstrate" such capability. 147
Even without these criticisms, the contrast between Justice Stevens's and
Justice Blackmun's opinions in Sony is unmistakable. For Justice Stevens,
the starting point was the consideration of copyright as a limited monopoly
right. In the absence of a clear congressional direction about the legality of
time shifting or other private copying or about liability of technology
developers for infringing acts of users, the Court should construe the
monopoly rights narrowly. A broad rule would interfere with legitimate
interests of the public in access to the technology and to programs shown on
broadcast television which they could not watch at the scheduled hour, as
well as with the interests of other copyright owners and with commerce.
For Justice Blackmun, the starting point was the exclusive property right
the law granted authors to control copying of copyrighted works. Any copy
was infringing unless it qualified as a fair use either because of its
productive character or because it caused truly de minimis harm.' 48
Copyright owners were entitled to control not only existing but also
potential markets. If copyright owners were able to find ways to charge for
new uses of their works, such as time shifting, they were entitled to control
these markets.
Had Justice Blackmun's framework of analysis been adopted by the
Court in Sony, many legal developments discussed below as the legacy of
Sony would have been unlikely, impossible, or at least far more difficult to
achieve. Stevens and Blackmun could hardly be more different in their
interpretations of fair use, and in the manner in which they approach
judicial decision making on copyright issues. Justice Stevens's limited
monopoly framework asks courts to consider what the copyright law says
(or does not say) about the legal issue presented in a particular case, what
Congress anticipated when enacting that language, and how public interest
in access to copyrighted works and to technology will be affected by the
court's decision. "'When technological change has rendered its literal
terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic
purpose,"' 149 which, in Justice Stevens's view, lies in promoting public
146. Id. This potential remedy is worth noting, in part, because Congress is currently
considering legislation to impose such a requirement on makers of certain information
technologies. See H.R. 4569, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
147. Sony, 464 U.S. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 481-82 (noting that "[plhotocopying an old newspaper clipping to send to a
friend" would cause de minimis harm).
149. Id. at 432 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (holding that playing the radio at a fast food restaurant was not a public performance
for which copyright permissions must be obtained)).
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access to knowledge. 150 Justice Blackmun's proprietarian framework, by
contrast, focuses on whether there has been unauthorized (and hence
presumptively unfair) copying and whether there is a potential market to
charge users for such copying.
III. THE LEGACY OF SONY
The most obvious and most commercially significant legacy of Sony is
the safe harbor it established for technologies having or capable of having
substantial non-infringing uses. Sony has been characterized as the "Magna
Carta" of the information technology industry. 151 Without the safe harbor it
provides, tape recorders, photocopiers, CD burners, CD ripping software,
iPods, and MP3 players, and a host of other technologies that facilitate
private or personal use copying might have never become widely
available. 152 While Jessica Litman may be right that Sony has not insulated
all makers of reprography technologies from lawsuits, 153 this is not because
of ambiguities or deficiencies in the safe harbor, but rather because the
entertainment industry has been unwilling to accept that Sony really
established the safe harbor it announced. 154 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,155 the entertainment industry believed the
right factual circumstances were in place-its expert opined that nearly
ninety percent of the uses of peer-to-peer ("p2p") technologies were
infringing or likely infringing 156-for overturning or substantially
narrowing the Sony safe harbor. Although the Court did rule in favor of
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM") and directed the lower courts to consider
whether Grokster had induced user infringements, 157 it saw no need to
150. Id. at 432.
151. Litman, supra note 76, at 951.
152. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the regulation of digital audio taping
technologies and a legal challenge to MP3 players.
153. Litman, supra note 76, at 951. Digital audio tape recorders, MP3 players, and digital
video recorders were challenged for contributing to copyright infringement. Id.
154. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15-20, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 543 U.S. 1032 (2004) (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM v Grokster/20041008Groksterfinaljpetition.pdf
(interpreting Sony as a "primary use" case).
155. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated
and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
156. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct 2764, 2772 (2005).
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM") emphasized this evidence in framing the question on
which it asked the Court to take its appeal:
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding.., that the Intemet-based "file
sharing" services Grokster and StreamCast should be immunized from copyright
liability for the millions of daily acts of copyright infringement that occur on their
services and that constitute at least 90% of the total use of the services.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 154, at i. Contrast this with the question the
Court ultimately decided to address: "[U]nder what circumstances [is] the distributor of a
product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement
by third parties using the product." Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
157. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
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revisit the Sony safe harbor or quantify the level of infringement that would
disqualify a firm from raising it, as MGM wanted. 158
This part considers the legacy of Justice Stevens's opinion in Sony in and
beyond the safe harbor it established for technologies suitable for
substantial non-infringing uses. Sony has been highly influential in new
technology cases, such as those permitting reverse engineering of computer
programs and development of add-on software, and those limiting liability
of Internet service providers and search engines. 159  Digital access
initiatives, such as the Internet Archive and Google's Book Search
Project, 160 rely on Sony as a key supporting precedent. Had Justice
Blackmun's fair use analysis prevailed in Sony, few, if any, of these
developments would have survived copyright challenges.
A. Safe Harbor for Technologies with Substantial Non-Infringing Uses
That Sony established a safe harbor for technologies having a substantial
non-infringing use was recognized in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd. 161
Prolok, Vault's copy-protection software, enabled application software
developers to prevent their customers from making unauthorized copies of
programs loaded onto Prolok-protected disks.162 Quaid reverse-engineered
Prolok and developed and commercially distributed a program called
CopyWrite, a feature of which, Ramkey, could unlock Prolok and enable
users to make unauthorized copies of application software. 163  Vault
claimed, among other things, that Quaid was liable for contributory
copyright infringement because of the Rarnkey feature. 164 Vault asserted
that Quaid knew that Ramkey would be widely used to enable infringement,
and the court took notice of the high rate of software "piracy" that
158. Id. at 2778. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's concurrence suggests she holds a
narrower view of the Sony safe harbor than the majority and Justice Breyer. Compare id. at
2783-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) with id. at 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
159. For discussion of these developments, see infra notes 287-333 and accompanying
text.
160. The Internet Archive is a nonprofit organization "that was founded to build an
'Internet library,' with the purpose of offering permanent access for researchers, historians,
and scholars to historical collections that exist in digital format." Internet Archive, About IA,
http://www.archive.org/about/about.php (last visited Feb. 12, 2006). Google Book Search is
a similar initiative which aims at eventually having the full text of all books online and
searchable. Google Book Search, Our Vision,
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/vision.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
161. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
162. Id. at 256-57.
163. Id. at 257-58.
164. The trial court had ruled that Vault lacked standing to challenge Quaid for
contributory infringement because any infringements that might have occurred would be of
application program copyrights of which it was not an owner. The appellate court ruled that
Vault had standing to raise a contributory infringement claim on account of the losses it
allegedly sustained in its customer base. Id. at 262-63. Contributory infringement was only
one of several claims against Quaid; none succeeded.
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explained why firms might want to use technologies such as Prolok to
prevent it.165
Quaid argued that Sony protected it from the contributory infringement
claim because its software was capable of a substantial non-infringing use,
namely, enabling users to make backup copies of software, which copyright
law expressly permitted. 166 The appellate court rejected Vault's narrow
interpretation of the backup copying privilege, and ruled that under Sony,
Quaid could not be held liable for contributory infringement because of its
utility for backup copying. 167
Not every defendant who has raised a Sony safe harbor defense has
succeeded.168 When Sega sued the operator of a commercial bulletin board
service that had been charging fees to users for the privilege of uploading
and downloading Sega games and providing users with software enabling
them to strip the games off Sega disks, MAPHIA (yes, that really was the
operator's moniker) claimed that Sony shielded his activities. 169 MAPHIA
claimed to be enabling private noncommercial copying of Sega games
under Sony; the software he provided for ripping games from their disks
was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, and, he asserted, lawful
under Sony. Yet because MAPHIA was actively encouraging his customers
to make infringing copies of Sega games and charging them money for the
privilege, the court found MAPHIA's Sony defense unpersuasive and held
him liable for contributory infringement. 170
The Sony safe harbor was not significantly challenged as a copyright rule
until the emergence of p2p file sharing technologies such as Napster.
Napster developed software that enabled its many millions of registered
users to share MP3 files of recorded music via the Internet. 171 Napster
maintained a centralized search and directory system through which users
of its client-side software could search for files of music they desired by
album, song title, or artist name; upon finding the desired match, users
could download the music directly from computers of their peers whose
directories included the desired files. Because copies did not pass through
165. Id. at 261 n.13.
166. Id. at 264.
167. Id. at 266. Vault argued that Congress had only intended to allow backup copying to
protect against mechanical and electromechanical failures, making use of Ramkey
unnecessary, but the court decided that Congress intended to enable fully functional backup
copies. Use of a program such as Ramkey was necessary to enable this kind of backup. Id.
168. Other unsuccessful Sony safe harbor cases are A&MRecords, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948
F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network
Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990).
169. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
170. See id. at 933-36. Users were obviously not making "private noncommercial" copies
akin to time-shift copies in the home; they were downloading whole programs and
presumably not erasing them after a first testing; hence, there was meaningful likelihood of
harm to the market for the commercial programs being traded on the site. MAPHIA knew of
these infringing uses, contributed to them, and indeed induced them. See id.
171. The Napster system was described in A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001).
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and were not stored on Napster's central servers, Napster was not a direct
infringer, 172  but A&M Records, among others, sued Napster for
contributory and vicarious infringement.
Napster's principal defense was its eligibility for the Sony safe harbor
because of the authorized and fair uses it enabled and the capabilities of its
system for a wide range of non-infringing uses. 173 The trial court rejected
Napster's Sony safe harbor defense and granted A&M Records's motion for
preliminary injunction, finding it was likely to succeed in establishing
secondary liability of Napster for user infringements. 174
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's rulings on secondary
liability. 175 It agreed with the trial court that downloading MP3 files with
the aid of Napster was not fair use, even for space shifting and sampling
purposes. 176 Napster knew it was contributing to user infringements and
provided the sites and facilities for user infringements, and hence was a
contributory infringer.177 The Sony safe harbor did not apply, the Ninth
Circuit opined, if one had actual knowledge of infringements or if one was
charged with vicarious infringement.178 Napster was a vicarious infringer,
the court held, because it had the right and ability to control its registered
users and their infringements, and having failed to exercise this control to
prevent infringements, it should be held responsible for them. 179 Yet the
Ninth Circuit chided the trial court for not considering the non-infringing
capabilities of Napster 180 and reversed in part because of overbreadth of the
injunction.181
172. A direct infringement claim for unlawful distribution of copyrighted works was
made in the course of follow-on litigation against venture capital firm Hummer Winblad and
Bertelsmann as investors in Napster. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp.
2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that Napster's index may have made files available for
sharing, but indexing did not constitute distribution of copies).
173. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004. Napster also argued that uploading and downloading of
recorded music was privileged by 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000), and if users were not infringing,
it could not be secondarily liable. Napster also argued that it qualified for Internet service
provider ("ISP") safe harbors from secondary liability under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (d) (2000).
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court that Napster users were not privileged to engage
in downloading under § 1008. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024-25. The trial court ruled
against the § 512 defenses, and the Ninth Circuit thought there was ample evidence to
support the lower court ruling on this issue. Id. at 1025.
174. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
175. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
176. Id. at 1014-19.
177. Id. at 1019-22.
178. Id. at 1021-22. Professor Paul Goldstein criticized the Ninth Circuit's Napster
decision for blurring the distinction between the requirement that a contributor have
knowledge of infringement and eligibility for the Sony safe harbor on account of substantial
non-infringing uses. See 2 Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 8.1.2 (3d ed. 2005).
179. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022-24.
180. Id. at 1021 ("The district court improperly confined the use analysis to current uses,
ignoring the system's capabilities.").
181. Id. at 1027-28 ("The preliminary injunction.., is overbroad because it places on
Napster the entire burden of ensuring that no 'copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing' of plaintiffs' works occur on the system .... [W]e place the
burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and files containing
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Emboldened by the success against Napster, major recording firms sued
Aimster, another p2p file sharing service, making several arguments aimed
at confining Sony to its facts. They argued, for example, that secondary
liability could be imposed (1) if the primary use of the defendant's system
was infringing; (2) if the defendant was providing a service, instead of a
device (such as a Betamax machine); (3) if there was an ongoing
relationship between the defendant and its infringing users; (4) the
defendant enabled more than home copying (e.g., distribution of copies);
and (5) if the system was specifically designed to enable infringement. 182
Such arguments were, the court concluded, addressed to the wrong forum
(i.e., the arguments should be made to Congress, not the courts). 183
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did, however,
affirm a preliminary injunction against Aimster as an indirect infringer.184
Aimster had not shown, the court said, that it qualified for the Sony safe
harbor: "Aimster has failed to produce any evidence that its service has
ever been used for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the
frequency of such uses. ''185 Although the Aimster decision articulates
several possible non-infringing uses of the system, the court opined that
merely being capable of a non-infringing use does not qualify a technology
developer for the Sony safe harbor.186
Strongly supporting the Seventh Circuit's ruling were two key facts
about Aimster: that its site offered a tutorial showing users how to find and
share copyrighted music they desired (that is, how to engage in infringing
uses of the system) and that it offered a "premium" service for a monthly
fee that gave users access to a service making it easy to obtain the "top 40"
songs available via Aimster. 187
Judge Richard Posner's opinion in Aimster did not rest its conclusion
about secondary liability on these features. It proposed instead that courts
should use a cost-benefit test for determining secondary liability of
technology developers for user copyright infringements. Under the test,
courts would consider how costly it would be to develop infringement-
inhibiting technical designs and how much infringement would be averted
thereby. Unless it would be "disproportionately costly" to prevent
infringements, technologists who failed to incorporate infringement-
inhibiting features should be held responsible for infringements that
ensue. 
188
such works available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to disable access to
the offending content.").
182. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 655-56.
185. Id. at 653.
186. Id at 652-53.
187. Id. at 651-52.
188. Id at 653; see also Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for
Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 395 (2003).
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When faced with the entertainment industry's appeal in yet another p2p
file sharing technology case in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.,189 the Ninth Circuit accepted the Sony safe harbor as the
proper framework for analysis. The lower court had correctly ruled, it said,
that the current version of Grokster's software qualified for the Sony safe
harbor from contributory liability because Grokster offered proof that its
software was being used for many non-infringing uses and was capable of
many more. 190 The court concluded that vicarious liability could not be
imposed on Grokster because the decentralized architecture of its system
made it impossible for it to exercise control over its users. 191 MGM did not
persuade the court that Grokster should be vicariously liable for
infringement because it failed to build infringement-inhibiting features,
such as filters, into its system. 192 Invoking Sony, the court told MGM to
take its pleas for alternative secondary liability rules to Congress. 193
After the Supreme Court granted MGM's petition for certiorari, 194 MGM
and legions of amici wrote briefs criticizing the Ninth Circuit's ruling and
the Sony safe harbor and proposing many alternative tests and frameworks
for analysis. 195 Grokster and its amici circled wagons around the Sony safe
harbor as a sound legal principle that had stood the test of time and
appropriately balanced the interests of copyright owners, technology
developers, and the public, and if change was needed to secondary liability
rules, Congress, not the courts, should make it. 196
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding, it did
not repudiate the Sony safe harbor for technologies having substantial non-
infringing uses, as MGM had hoped.197 MGM was unable to persuade the
Court to adopt any of the far broader secondary liability rules for which it
argued. 198 Justice Souter's opinion for the Court pointed out that the Sony
safe harbor "leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous
commerce. '"199 The Court explained at some length the rationale for
recognizing a safe harbor from secondary liability for those who make or
189. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
190. Id. at 1161-62.
191. Id. at 1165. The Ninth Circuit's Napster decision emphasized that Napster's ability
to control its users was affected by its architecture. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
192. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1166.
193. Id. at 1167.
194. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 543 U.S. 1032 (2004).
195. The briefs filed by MGM and supporting amici can be found at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-v Grokster/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). Several briefs
were also filed that supported neither party.
196. The briefs filed by Grokster and its supporting amici can also be found at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-v Grokster/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
197. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-80.
198. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Did MGM Really Win the Grokster Case?,
Communications of ACM, Oct. 2005, at 19 (discussing MGM's broader secondary liability
rules and the Court's response to them).
199. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
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sell technologies with substantial non-infringing uses.2 00 When a product is
"good for nothing else but infringement, there is no legitimate public
interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming
or imputing an intent to infringe." 201 In Sony, "the only conceivable basis
for imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement arising
from its sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge that some would use
them to infringe," 20 2 and a now-unanimous Court agreed that this theory
simply went too far. The Court warned against interpreting its decision in
Grokster in a manner that would tread too closely on the Sony safe
harbor. 203
B. Inducing Copyright Infringement
The Supreme Court could easily have decided in Grokster that inducing
copyright infringement should be a basis for secondary liability without
invoking Sony.204 Because the Court's rationale for this ruling was so
interconnected with its explanation of the soundness of its ruling in Sony,205
it is fair to treat Grokster's inducement standard as another facet of Sony's
legacy.206
200. Id. at 2777-80.
201. Id. at 2777 (citation and internal quotation omitted).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2781 n.12 (noting that it is inappropriate to infer intent to induce infringement
from failure to adopt affirmative steps to avoid infringement because it would "tread too
close to the Sony safe harbor").
204. The Supreme Court in Grokster characterized inducement liability as a subcategory
of contributory infringement. See id. at 2776. This was plausible because the court in
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971), had spoken of inducing or materially contributing to infringement as a basis for
secondary liability. In patent law, inducement and contributory infringement are two
separate theories of indirect liability. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c) (2000). Because
inducement and contributory infringement have distinct elements, inducement should be
conceptualized in copyright as a separate basis for imposing indirect liability.
205. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777-81.
206. The Court said, for example, "For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article
doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too,
is a sensible one for copyright." Id. at 2780. That the Court in Grokster would so explicitly
endorse borrowing both rules from patent law was by no means certain, especially given that
some amici severely criticized the Court for having borrowed from patent law in Sony. See,
e.g., Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, Robert P. Merges, and Justin
Hughes, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Grokster, 543 U.S. 1032 (No. 04-480),
reprinted in 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 509, 520-26 (2005), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/050125-Menell.pdf. Several technology
industry associations, however, strongly endorsed the Sony safe harbor and urged the Court
to reverse and remand for consideration of a patent-like inducement theory. See, e.g., Brief
of the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Grokster, 543
U.S. 1032 (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/1P/P2PiMGM_v_Grokster/050124_BSAGroksterBrief.pdf; Brief of
IEEE-USA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Grokster, 543 U.S. 1032 (No. 04-
480), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/050124_IEEE.pdf; Amicus
Curiae Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Ass'n in Support of Vacatur and
Remand, Grokster, 543 U.S. 1032 (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM_v_Grokster/050124_AIPLAGroksterAmicusBrief.pdf,
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The Court acknowledged that Sony had barred imposing secondary
liability "based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement
solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial
lawful use." 207  But Sony should not be construed to mean that "the
producer [of a technology suitable for non-infringing uses] can never be
held contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of it."'20 8 The
Court observed that "where evidence goes beyond a product's
characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and
shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's
staple-article rule will not preclude liability. ' 20 9 Because there was such
evidence in Grokster, the Court remanded the case for assessment of
Grokster's liability on an active inducement theory.210
The Court's decision in Grokster to import patent law's inducement rule
into copyright presages that copyright owners will have to meet a stiff
burden of proof to establish inducement liability.211 Patent law requires
proof of overt acts of inducement, 212 such as advertising that actively
promotes infringing uses or instruction manuals that show users how to
infringe, as well as proof of a specific intent to induce infringement.213
There must also be infringing acts that were induced by this defendant. 214
The case law on patent inducement liability makes clear that merely making
or selling an infringement-enabling technology is not inducement, even if
Brief of the Digital Media Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Grokster, 543 U.S. 1032 (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-v Grokster/050124_DiMA+Netcoal+ITAA+CDTGrokst
er Friend of CourtBrief.pdf.
207. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2779. The Court pointed out that the staple article of commerce rule of patent
law was not a defense to inducement liability either. Id. at 2779 n.10.
210. The Court said that "[tihere is substantial evidence in MGM's favor on all elements
of inducement." Id. at 2782. It also suggested that the lower court on remand should
reconsider MGM's motion for summary judgment. Id. Grokster settled the lawsuit with
MGM within months of the Supreme Court's ruling. See, e.g., Matthai Chakko Kuruvila,
Hollywood Breathes Sigh of Relief Over Grokster's Demise, Settlement, The Mercury News
(San Jose, CA), Nov. 8, 2005, at IC, available at
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/technology/1 3111968.htm.
211. The Court not only invoked, at considerable length, the patent inducement case law,
but spoke of the need for evidence of culpable intent to infringe and of affirmative steps to
bring about infringement. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777-80. This is in striking contrast to
the INDUCE Act that Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy introduced in the summer of
2004, which would have allowed inferring inducement based on foreseeability of
infringement. See S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004); see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson,
Legislative Challenges to the Sony Safe Harbor Rule, Communications of ACM, Mar. 2005,
at 27. Yet, the Court's willingness to accept evidence from internal emails as a basis for
inferring intent to induce infringement, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2773, raises questions about
how consistent copyright inducement rulings will be with patent inducement case law.
212. See, e.g., 5 Chisum on Patents, supra note 102, § 17.04[4].
213. Id. § 17.04[2].
214. Id. § 17.04[1].
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the technology is widely used for infringing purposes.215 The Court in
Grokster similarly opined that "mere knowledge of infringing potential or
of actual infringing uses" would not give rise to inducement liability, nor
"would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering
customers technical support or product updates. '216 Inducement liability
requires proof of "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct. '217 High
standards of proof for inducement liability will ensure that secondary
liability rules would not "compromise legitimate commerce or discourage
innovation having a lawful promise." 218
C. Statutory Overrides of the Sony Safe Harbor
Twice during the 1990s, Congress decided that copyright owners would
be too vulnerable to substantial volumes of unlawful copying unless there
was some statutory adjustment to the Sony safe harbor rule for specific
technologies. By enacting the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") in
1992, Congress decided to regulate digital audiotape recorder ("DAR")
technologies, 219 and in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") of
1998, it chose to regulate technologies primarily designed to circumvent
technical protection measures ("TPMs") used by copyright owners to
protect their works. 220
These laws are a legacy of Sony for at least three reasons: because
Congress has accepted the Sony safe harbor as a default rule for limiting
technology developer liability; because statutory overrides to the safe
harbor require a showing of serious threats to copyright owner interests; and
because even these statutory overrides incorporate some limiting principles
from Sony.
The AHRA, for example, was compromise legislation that responded to
the emergence of DAR technologies designed to allow consumers not only
to play recorded music, but also to make copies of DAR recordings. "From
215. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding that selling a staple article was not contributory infringement "even when the
defendant has actual knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the
patent"). In patent law, a firm that has been held liable for inducement is entitled to continue
to sell staple articles after ceasing the inducement of patent infringement. See 5 Chisum on
Patents, supra note 102, § 17.04. It remains to be seen whether technology developers that
cease inducing copyright infringement will be able to continue to supply technologies
suitable for non-infringing uses. The Court did not specifically address this question,
although the tone of the Grokster decision suggests that Grokster could not have expected to
continue operations merely because it had stopped the "bad" acts that the Court regarded as
the basis for the infringement claim. For a discussion of the implications of making
technology developer liability for copyright infringement depend on "bad" intent, see, e.g.,
Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming April 2006).
216. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010
(2000)).
220. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)).
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the consumer's viewpoint, the advantage was that, unlike analog tapes,
whose sound quality deteriorates with each successive copy, digital tapes
promised not only flawless reproductions from original tapes but equally
flawless copies of copies." 221 Because DAR devices had and were capable
of substantial non-infringing uses, 222 the sound recording industry was
unlikely to succeed in any contributory infringement lawsuit against makers
of these machines. The recording industry first sought a moratorium on the
sale and distribution of DARs in the U.S. and then a legislative mandate to
require DARs to incorporate a TPM to prevent copying of copyrighted
sound recordings.223
The AHRA required consumer-grade DAR machines to have a serial
copy management system ("SCMS") chip that prevents users from being
able to make successive generations of perfect digital copies of copyrighted
sound recordings. 224 However, recognizing consumer interests in and
expectations of personal use copying, SCMS chips were designed to allow
users to make first-generation personal use copies of sound recordings. 225
The AHRA provided immunity from infringement liability for
noncommercial copies of DAR and analog sound recordings,2 26 arguably
codifying Sony's safe harbor for private non-commercial copying of this
class of copyrighted works. 227 To respond to the interests of composers of
music and their publishers, the AHRA also mandated a small percent tax on
DAR devices and tapes so that authors of music would be able to benefit
from this new market.228
The AHRA regulations were intentionally drawn narrowly to exclude
from coverage computers and other information technologies. 229 When the
recording industry sued the maker of an early MP3 player lacking an SCMS
chip for violating the AHRA, the Ninth Circuit ruled that MP3 players were
not subject to that law's constraints and could be freely sold in the
221. Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 129
(Stanford University Press, rev. ed. 2003) (1994).
222. The recording industry believed that digital audiotape recorders ("DARs") were
distinguishable from Betamax machines because of the greater likelihood that copies made
of DAR recordings would not be erased after one listening as time-shift copies of television
programs generally were. DARs were also useful for copying of content that had not been
broadcast off the air without charge to consumers. The risk was high, they believed, that
owners of DAR devices would use them to make multiple copies of sound recordings and
transfer those copies to persons who had not purchased them.
223. Goldstein, supra note 221, at 128-3 1.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2). Users can make unlimited first generation copies of DAR
recordings, but serial copy management system ("SCMS") affects the ability to make perfect
digital copies from first generation DAR copies.
225. Goldstein, supra note 221, at 131.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 1008.
227. See supra Part II.
228. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003(c)(3), 1004(a)(1); see Goldstein, supra note 221, at 131-32
(discussing the concerns of composers that led to the compulsory license on DAR machines).
229. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1075-79 (9th Cir. 1999).
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market.230 For this and other reasons, 231 the AHRA has not proven to be a
significant limit on the Sony safe harbor.
The DMCA anti-circumvention rules, in contrast, have had an impact on
the availability of certain technologies that would otherwise have qualified
for the Sony safe harbor. RealNetworks, for example, was able to get a
preliminary injunction to stop technology developer Streambox from
offering software called "Streambox VCR" to allow users to make personal
use copies of streamed music because of a TPM that owners of the music
had used to prevent downloading. 232 Streambox argued that it was entitled
to offer this product because of its substantial non-infringing uses under
Sony. The court concluded that the DMCA anti-circumvention rules had
overridden Sony as to technically protected copyrighted content.233
The most strident and Blackmun-like of the DMCA cases thus far has
been Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes.234 Universal and co-
plaintiffs charged Eric Corley (a.k.a. Emmanuel Goldstein), a journalist
who published an online news magazine focused on developments of
interest to the computer hacking community, with violating the DMCA
because Corley posted a copy of a program known as DeCSS on his website
as part of his coverage of the story of the development of this program
designed to bypass the Content Scramble System ("CSS") used to protect
DVD movies. Corley also linked to sites where DeCSS could be found.
Corley's primary defense was a facial challenge to the DMCA anti-
circumvention rules as an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. 235
The trial court interpreted the DMCA rules very strictly and held that
Corley had violated them both in posting and linking to DeCSS. 236
Although many commentators have suggested that some fair use hacking of
TPMs should be permissible, 237 the court rejected fair use and other
230. Id. at 1081.
231. Consumers did not find DARs with SCMS chips to be attractive, and the market for
these devices and tapes was consequently not very robust. The technology-specific character
of the Audio Home Recording Act and its abstruse definitions have also been criticized by
scholars and others. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 87
(2004).
232. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 18, 2000); see also 321 Studios, Inc. v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (granting partial summary judgment to MGM in a case
challenging 32 1's sale of software to enable backup copying of DVDs as a violation of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") anti-circumvention rules).
233. RealNetworks, 2000 WL 1273111, at *8-*9.
234. 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'dsub nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). Reimerdes settled before the case went to trial, leaving
Corley as the sole defendant.
235. It is difficult to discern Corley's argument because the trial judge was so
unsympathetic to it. The briefs are available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/NY/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
236. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 325-46.
237. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
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limiting principles proposed by Corley and his amici. 238 Yet, despite the
Reimerdes decision, DeCSS remains widely available on the Internet.239
More recent cases have conceived of the DMCA anti-circumvention rules
as intended to confer a limited monopoly right that plaintiffs can only
invoke when bypassing a TPM either causes or poses a serious threat of
copyright infringement. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,240 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit ruled that Static Control had not violated the DMCA anti-
circumvention rules when it installed software in printer cartridges that
bypassed an access control that Lexmark used in its printers so that only
Lexmark cartridges would be compatible with that firm's printers.
Although Lexmark's claim was plausible under the interpretation of the
anti-circumvention rules in Reimerdes,241 the court recognized that the
DMCA rules had been adopted to prevent copyright infringements, not
competition among makers of printer cartridges.
Nowhere in its deliberations over the DMCA did Congress express an
interest in creating liability for the circumvention of technological
measures designed to prevent consumers from using consumer goods
while leaving the copyrightable content of a work unprotected. In fact,
Congress added the interoperability provision in part to ensure that the
DMCA would not diminish the benefit to consumers of interoperable
devices "in the consumer electronics environment. '242
The Federal Circuit has taken a similarly restrictive view of the anti-
circumvention rules, saying plaintiffs must prove that the circumvention of
the technological measure either "infringes or facilitates infringing a right
protected by the Copyright Act. '24 3 In the lingo of Justice Stevens's
opinion in Sony, courts in DMCA cases should construe exclusive rights
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations
Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519 (1999). But see David Nimmer, A Riff on
Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000).
238. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 325-45.
239. On December 27, 2005, I entered "DeCSS" as a Google search term. Google
reported that more than 677,000 sites had responsive information. One of the top sites is that
maintained by Carnegie Mellon University researcher David Touretzky called a "Gallery of
CSS Descramblers." See Gallery of CSS Descramblers,
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-dst/DeCSS/Gallery/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
240. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). Because Static Controls copied one of the programs
installed in Lexmark's printer cartridge, Lexmark also sued for copyright infringement. The
court ruled that this lock-out code was not copyrightable, and hence, Static Controls'
copying did not infringe. Id. at 554-56.
241. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. Y. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943
(E.D. Ky. 2003) (relying on Reimerdes in ruling that Static Control had violated the DMCA
rules), rev'd, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
242. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549 (citations omitted).
243. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (holding that the DMCA was not violated by a firm selling a universal garage door
opener); accord Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421
F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the DMCA was not violated by a maintenance
service provider).
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narrowly and in light of the overall purposes of the law unless Congress has
made explicit that the monopoly right should be construed as the plaintiff
has requested. Otherwise, innovation and competition may be unreasonably
restricted.
D. Private or Personal Use Copying
Sony has also had a profound impact on the perceived legality of private
or personal use copying. Few subjects in copyright law have given rise to
more contention than whether, or to what extent, private or personal use
copying is lawful.244 In a memorandum prepared while the Court was
considering Sony, Justice Stevens questioned whether private or personal
use copying should ever be considered infringing,245 while Justice
Blackmun questioned whether private or personal use copying should ever
be lawful insofar as the copier consumed the work, rather than making
productive use of it, insofar as the whole of the work was copied, and
insofar as the rights holders might wish to charge a fee for the privilege of
making a private or personal copy. 246 Justice Stevens was able to persuade
four of his colleagues to accept not only that time-shift copying was fair,
but also that private noncommercial copying should be deemed
presumptively fair.247
The legality of private or personal use copying has rarely been tested in
litigation because such copying tends to occur in low visibility
circumstances; even if such copying is detected, it is generally not cost
efficient to bring a lawsuit to challenge it.248 The general public's view of
private or personal use copying is, however, far closer to the views
expressed in Justice Stevens's opinion in Sony than to those expressed by
Justice Blackmun.2 49 Private or personal use copying has, if anything,
244. See, e.g., Nat'l Research Council, The Digital Dilemma: Intellectual Property in the
Information Age 129 (2000).
245. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
247. Whether this presumption is still in force is disputed. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975 (2002).
248. In the Sony case, Universal's lawyers persuaded one of its clients to be named as a
defendant in the lawsuit and to testify about his personal use copying. As a condition of
adding him as a defendant, Universal agreed not to seek any damages or other relief against
him. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 436-37 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In at least one
case, a user of a digital video technology successfully intervened in a lawsuit brought by the
entertainment industry against the maker of the technology he had purchased, asserting he
had standing to intervene because the court would be addressing whether his use of the
technology was fair use or infringement. See Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F.
Supp. 2d 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
249. Goldstein, supra note 221, at 106; Nat'l Research Council, supra note 244, at 130;
see also Office of Tech. Assessment, Copyright & Home Copying: Technology Challenges
the Law 3 (1989) (reporting on a survey showing that four out often Americans over the age
of ten had copied music in the previous year, that "Americans tape-recorded individual
musical pieces over one billion times per year," and that "the public-those who had taped
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become more prevalent since Sony.250  This has posed significant
challenges for copyright industries that would like to extend their markets
for delivering content to the home or to consumers' personal devices.2 51
The split within the Court in Sony over private or personal use copying
was almost certainly colored by a case that had come before the Court
shortly before Justice Stevens joined the Court. In Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States,252 a publisher argued that a photocopying service provided
by the library of the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") was engaged in
copyright infringement when it copied articles from the publisher's Journal
of Immunology for NIH researchers. NIH argued that the copies were fair
uses because of the research purposes of those who requested copies and of
NIH, because the works were fact intensive, and because there was no, or
only negligible, harm to the market as the library had already purchased the
journals and individual researchers were unlikely to subscribe if unable to
use the library's copying service. 253
The trial court agreed with the publisher that this copying was
infringement, but the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals agreed with
NIH that the copying was fair use.254 The publisher appealed, and the
Court agreed to hear the appeal. During the oral argument, Justice
Thurgood Marshall asked the publishers' lawyers if members of Congress
infringed copyrights when they asked for photocopies of articles relevant to
their work, and Justice Warren Burger asked whether members of the Court
infringed if they asked for photocopies to be made of a chapter of a book
borrowed from the Library of Congress. 255 These questions suggested that
key members of the Court were sympathetic to NIH's fair use argument.
Yet, the Court split 4-4 on the fair use issue;256 Justice Blackmun did not
take part in the decision.257
and those who had not-believe it is acceptable to copy recorded music for one's own use or
to give to a friend as long as the copies are not sold").
250. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 244, at 130.
251. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 221, at 207-08.
252. 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
253. See Goldstein, supra note 221, at 63-103 (recounting the Williams & Wilkins
litigation story).
254. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d 1345.
255. Goldstein, supra note 221, at 92-96.
256. Williams & Wilkins, 420 U.S. at 378.
257. Professor Goldstein suggests this was because Justice Harry Blackmun had in the
past served as in-house counsel for the Mayo Clinic which filed an amicus brief in support of
National Institutes of Health's position. Goldstein, supra note 221, at 102. In view of his
strong views on private copying in Sony, see supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text, it
seems likely that Justice Blackmun would have been the fifth vote to reverse in Williams &
Wilkins. As a circuit judge, Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion in Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d
777 (8th Cir. 1962), holding that photocopying choral materials for a nonprofit performance
was unfair,
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The case most closely resembling Williams & Wilkins in the subsequent
case law was American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.258 Publishers of
eighty-two scientific and technical journals brought suit against Texaco for
copyright infringement arising from photocopying of articles from these
journals by Texaco's 400-500 research scientists. To limit litigation costs,
the parties agreed that Texaco's fair use defense would be tested by
considering eight photocopies in the files of one Texaco researcher, Donald
Chickering.
Texaco argued that Chickering's uses were fair because the copies were
personal use copies made to advance research; because the articles copied
were fact intensive and Chickering was only interested in them because of
the facts and ideas they contained; because individual articles, not whole
journals were copied, and because Texaco had subscribed to the journals at
an institutional rate. 259 Texaco relied in part on Sony in support of its fair
use argument.
The publishers contended, and Judge Jon 0. Newman for a 2-1 majority
agreed, that the uses were unfair in a high protectionist analysis akin to that
employed by Justice Blackmun in Sony. The copies were consumptive,
rather than productive (that is, the copies did not produce new knowledge),
because whole articles were copied, and because the potential market for
collecting fees through the Copyright Clearance Center was being harmed
by Texaco's unwillingness to pay for these copies. 260 Although publishers
also succeeded in a similar lawsuit against photocopy shops for reproducing
academic course packs for sale to students, 261 publishers have thus far not
pursued litigation against universities for personal use copies of copyrighted
articles made by faculty and students who would arguably present more
sympathetic fair use claims that would almost certainly rely on Sony.
Private and personal use copying remains prevalent and widely viewed, at
least by members of the public, as fair use.262
The Supreme Court did say a few things about private or personal use
copying in Grokster. The main "private" or "personal" use copying issue
arguably before the Court was the legality of p2p file sharing of
copyrighted sound recordings and music, for Grokster could not be
indirectly liable for copyright infringement without proof of infringements
to which it had contributed. 263 "MGM's evidence," said the Court,
258. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). Judge Jon 0. Newman wrote the majority opinion.
Judge Dennis Jacobs dissented.
259. Texaco's arguments found a receptive audience in the dissenting opinion of Judge
Jacobs. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 932-41 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
260. The publishers' argument was largely accepted by Judge Newman in his opinion in
Texaco.
261. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
262. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use (Nov. 2, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
263. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 (2005)
(noting that secondary liability depends on proof of underlying infringements).
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gives reason to think that the vast majority of users' downloads are acts of
infringement, and because well over 100 million copies of the software in
question are known to have been downloaded, and billions of files are
shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the
probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering. 264
The scale and scope of p2p copying, the public nature of the searches and
exchanges on the Internet, the copying of whole movies and recorded
albums, and the potential for harm to the market make this form of personal
use copying an implausible candidate for fair use.265
Yet, the Court now appears to be unanimous in regarding time-shift
copying as in Sony as a fair use.2 66 This in itself is a remarkable evolution.
Indeed, the Court in Grokster arguably went further than the majority had
been willing to go in Sony in saying that although Sony's ads had "urged
consumers to buy the VCR to 'record favorite shows' or 'build a library' of
recorded programs, neither of these uses was necessarily infringing. '267
This suggests that the Court has a more favorable view about private or
personal use copying than the long-ago deep splits in Williams & Wilkins
and Sony might have suggested.
E. Backup Copying and Space, Platform, and Format Shifting
To illustrate the continued vitality of Sony as a precedent supporting fair
use for a significant number of private or personal use copies, this section
discusses some common personal uses such as backup copying and space,
platform and format shifting which I regard as fair uses under Sony.268
Backup copying of digital information is widely considered to be a sound
and lawful practice because computers may "crash" or get stolen, either of
which may cause users to lose information stored on them.269 Although
Congress adopted a special exception that permits backup (archival)
copying of programs to accommodate this sound practice, 270 there is no
comparable provision that privileges backup copying of other digital works,
such as electronic books, articles, or music. I contend that backup copying
264. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772. Unlike Napster, see supra note 173 and accompanying
text, Grokster did not contest that most downloads were infringing. See BMG Music v.
Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming that personal use copying of copyrighted
sound recordings through p2p file-sharing is infringement).
265. Given the Court's reaction, it is not surprising that fair use arguments for file-sharing
were not well-received in BMG. See BMG Music, 430 F.3d 888 (rejecting the fair use
defense of a p2p file sharer).
266. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777.
267, Id. (citations omitted). Although Justice Stevens was willing to say that building a
personal use library was fair use, other Justices at the time were reluctant to go that far. See
Litman, supra note 61.
268. DigitalConsumer.org considers these to be among the "Technology Consumers' Bill
of Rights" for digital information. See DigitalConsumer.org, Digital Consumers' Bill of
Rights, http://digitalconsumer.orglbill.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
269. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 264 n.18 (5th Cir. 1988).
270. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2) (2000).
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of this content too is fair use and sound practice. 271 The purpose of the use,
as in Sony, is private and noncommercial, and the copying is typically of
content the backup copier is entitled to access and use. Whole works are
copied in the course of backups, but backup copies are only utilized if a
problem arises, and the harm to copyright owners is minimal or
nonexistent. 272
Very similar arguments can be made that format shifting, platform
shifting, and space shifting, as well as time shifting should be fair uses. 273
Format shifting, that is, transforming a digital file from, for example, a
WMA to an MP3 format in order to be able to listen to the file on an MP3
player, is a common and well-accepted practice. 274 Platform shifting, that
is, making a copy of a digital work to make it playable on a different device
is similarly widely accepted as fair. During oral argument before the
Supreme Court in the Grokster case, MGM's counsel conceded that
"ripping" music from a purchased CD to play on one's computer or an iPod
is fair use. 275 This is a form of platform shifting.
The Ninth Circuit invoked Sony in opining that space shifting of digital
music does not infringe copyrights. In Recording Industry Ass'n of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, 276 the principal question was
whether Diamond could make and sell the Rio, a portable music device for
playing MP3 files of music, without building into it the SCMS chip
required by the AHRA. The court ruled that the Rio was not covered by the
AHRA, and considered its principal use to be lawful:
The Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or "space-shift,"
those files that already reside on a user's hard drive. Cf Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455, 104 S. Ct. 774, 78
L. Ed. 2d 574 (1984) (holding that "time-shifting" of copyrighted
television shows with VCR's constitutes fair use under the Copyright Act,
and thus is not an infringement). Such copying is paradigmatic
271. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 262.
272. Justice Blackmun's high-protectionist framework might yield a finding of
unfairness, for the copies would be nonproductive, the content copied might include
entertainment works (such as MP3 files), whole works would be copied, and copyright
owners might be interested in exploiting the market for new copies after copies on hard
drives were no longer available to users. See supra notes 118-47 and accompanying text.
273. See DigitalConsumer.org, supra note 268.
274. In RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000), the court rejected RealNetwork's argument that Streambox's
"ripper" software for transforming digital files from one format to another violated the
DMCA anti-circumvention rules. The court reasoned that formats were not considered
effective technical protection measures, and it was common for firms and individuals to
format shift for legitimate purposes. See id. at * 10-* 11.
275. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/04-480.pdf (last
visited Jan. 29, 2006) ("[l]t's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it
onto your computer, put it onto your iPod. [That is] a very, very significant lawful
commercial use for that device.").
276. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
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noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the
Act.277
Noncommercial copying of analog sound recordings and digital audio
files covered by the AHRA is, moreover, statutorily immunized from
copyright liability.278
Even though backup and time, place, and format shifting may be easy
fair use cases, commercial firms that seek to facilitate such fair uses have
encountered legal challenges. MP3.com, for example, cast itself as a
facilitator of customer place shifting, which it believed was lawful under
Sony. Its "MyMP3.com" service allowed subscribers to store and listen to
recordings from CDs they owned from anywhere having an Internet
connection. 279  MP3.com verified user ownership of CDs for their
MP3.com "lockers" in one of two ways: by having customers load the
owned CD onto their networked computers or by verifying purchases of
CDs from an online vendor. To make this new service work, MP3.com
purchased thousands of CDs and copied the music from them onto the
firm's servers, from which subscribers could then listen to the music they
already owned. MP3.com argued that the database of music ripped from
these CDs was fair use akin to the intermediate copying for reverse
engineering purposes that the Ninth Circuit had ruled was fair use in Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.280
The trial judge in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc. rejected
MP3.com's fair use argument in a high-protectionist, Blackmun-style
opinion. 28 1 MP3.com's purpose in making copies was commercial and
non-productive. 282 Whole works were copied, and they were entertainment
works that tend to enjoy greater protection from fair use than other
works. 283 The harm to UMG's market was harm to the licensing fees it
would have charged firms like MP3.com to offer such a service. 284 To
MP3.com's proffered societal benefits, the court responded,
Any allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities on plaintiffs' prior
market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that directly
derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. This
would be so even if the copyrightholder had not yet entered the new
market in issue, for a copyrightholder's "exclusive" rights, derived from
the Constitution and the Copyright Act, include the right, within broad
limits, to curb the development of such a derivative market by refusing to
277. Id. at 1079.
278. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
279. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (describing MP3.com and its services).
280. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussed infra notes 290-306 and accompanying
text). As shown below, Accolade relied heavily on Sony for support of its fair use claim.
281. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349.
282. Id. at 351.
283. Id. at 351-52.
284. Id. at 352.
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license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copyright
owner finds acceptable....
... Copyright, however, is not designed to afford consumer protection
or convenience but, rather, to protect the copyrightholders' property
interests .... Stripped to its essence, defendant's "consumer protection"
argument amounts to nothing more than a bald claim that defendant
should be able to misappropriate plaintiffs' property simply because there
is a consumer demand for it. This hardly appeals to the conscience of
equity.2 85
The rationale for the MP3.com ruling, like the Texaco ruling discussed
above, follow the analytic path articulated in Justice Blackmun's dissent.286
It may be that Justice Stevens would also have ruled against MP3.com's fair
use defense, but the reasoning he would have used would have likely been
quite different. It is interesting that technology developers are able under
Sony to facilitate customers' fair uses, but service provider-facilitators such
as MP3.com have generally not fared well in the modem U.S. copyright
case law.
F. Reverse Engineering of Computer Software
Sony was a key precedent relied upon by courts considering whether
copies made of computer programs in the course of reverse engineering,
undertaken for purposes of achieving interoperability among programs,
qualified as fair uses. This was among the most contentious copyright
issues of the late 1980s and early 1990s.287 Reverse engineering was often
necessary in order to get access to information about the program's
functions or interface specifications for achieving interoperability when
source code forms of programs were not publicly available. 288 Reverse
285. Id. (citation omitted).
286. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
287. The literature on reverse engineering of computer programs is vast. The most
prominent article arguing that reverse engineering of software violated copyright law is
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 978 (1993). Among
the many articles arguing that reverse engineering programs do not violate copyright law are:
Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-out" Programs, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1091 (1995); Dennis S.
Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and Professor
Miller, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 975 (1994); Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1992, at 185. For a fuller bibliography of this literature, see
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering,
111 Yale L. J. 1575, 1609 n.163 (2002).
288. See, e.g., Andrew Johnson-Laird, Reverse Engineering of Software: Separating
Legal Mythology from Actual Technology, 5 Software L.J. 331 (1992). In recent years, it has
become more common for programs to be released with source code, especially code
released under the General Public License published by the Free Software Foundation and
code released under open source licenses. For a definition of open source as a form of
software distribution, see Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org (last visited
Feb. 3, 2006).
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engineering inevitably involves making unauthorized copies of the program
code, which some claimed was copyright infringement. 289
The seminal case on the legality of reverse engineering, as a matter of
copyright law, is Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.290 Sega was the
maker of the Genesis videogame platform as well as the maker and licensor
for videogames for the Genesis platform. Sega sued Accolade for copyright
infringement because Accolade reverse engineered Sega program code in
order to discern information necessary for making games that could
interoperate with the Genesis platform. 291 Accolade's principal defense
was that reverse-engineering copies qualified as fair uses.29 2
Sega responded to this defense with a high protectionist analysis akin to
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony: Accolade's purpose was commercial,
and hence presumptively unfair.293 The information Accolade sought was
unpublished, which also weighed against fair use. 294 The whole of the
program had also been copied.295 Accolade's reverse engineering had
resulted in actual or potential harm to its market, 296 Sega argued, and thus
all factors weighed against fair use.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Sega's fair use analysis. It rejected as
"far too simple" Sega's argument that Accolade's commercial purpose
should cause its use of Sega's work to be presumed unfair.297 Among the
other relevant considerations were that "Accolade copied Sega's software
solely in order to discover the functional requirements for compatibility
with the Genesis console. ' 298 Accolade had developed its own games
independently, and its "identification of the functional requirements for
289. See, e.g., Allen R. Grogan, Decompilation and Disassembly: Undoing Software
Protection, Computer Law., Feb. 1984, at 1. Decompilation was, in Grogan's view,
copyright infringement because it involved making unauthorized copies of the program, in
violation of the author's exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies under 17 U.S.C. §
106(1) (2000). Decompilation was trade secret misappropriation because the unlawful
copies made in the course of reverse engineering were an improper means of obtaining trade
secrets embodied in the code. Insofar as the program being decompiled was also protected
by a shrinkwrap license agreement whose terms included an anti-reverse-engineering
provision, decompilation was also a wrongful means of obtaining the secret for a second
reason. IBM Corp. was among the firms that argued against the legality of software reverse
engineering. See Nat'l Research Council, Intellectual Property Issues in Software 78 (1991).
290. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.,
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
291. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514-16.
292. Id. at 1521-28.
293. Id. at 1522. Sega invoked Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539 (1985), as the basis for the presumption of unfairness in commercial purpose
cases. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522.
294. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 n.9. Sega invoked Harper & Row for the proposition that
fair use was rarely available as to unpublished information.
295. Id. at 1526-27.
296. Id. at 1523-24. Sega licensed numerous other firms to make games that
interoperated with its Genesis platform, although it offered terms that Accolade found
unattractive.
297. Id. at 1522.
298. Id.
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Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the number of independently
developed designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis
console." 299  The only harm Sega could have suffered arose from
competition between its games and non-infringing games such as
Accolade's. 300
In explaining its conclusion that reverse engineering was fair use, the
Ninth Circuit relied upon Sony in two key respects. First, although copying
the whole of Sega's programs did weigh against fair use, the court cited
Sony as "'teach[ing] us that the copying of an entire work does not preclude
fair use per se."'301 Second, the Ninth Circuit cited Sony for the
proposition that "[w]hen technological change has rendered an aspect or
application of the Copyright Act ambiguous, 'the Copyright Act must be
construed in light of [its] basic purpose."' 30 2 To construe the law as Sega
proposed would defeat, not promote, the basic purposes of copyright law. 303
Sega's argument would "confer[] on the copyright owner a de facto
monopoly over [the program's] ideas and functional concepts." 304 Sony
thus contributed to the conceptual groundings for the Sega ruling,305 which
has been consistently followed in the years thereafter. 30 6
G. Safe Harbor for Add-On Software
The influence of Sony was also evident in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo ofAmerica, Inc.307 Galoob distributed
299. Id. at 1523.
300. Id. at 1523-24. Accolade's games for the Sega platform gave the public more
choices of competing products from which to choose, and besides, many consumers buy
multiple games.
301. Id. at 1526 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148,
1155 (9th Cir. 1986)).
302. Id. at 1527 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. The Court's decisions in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
499 U.S. 340 (1991), and Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), were also important to the
Ninth Circuit's fair use analysis. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523-27.
306. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000); DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Bateman v.
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1996). All of these cases also cite Sony in support
of their analyses in favor of reverse engineering.
307. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). While the safe harbor for add-on software may seem
to be a subset of the technology safe harbor discussed above in section A, I have chosen to
highlight this aspect of Sony's legacy in a separate section because it raises questions,
especially about derivative work rights, that do not arise in reprography technology cases,
such as Sony and the peer-to-peer cases. There is a stronger argument, for example, that
copyright owners have an interest in control over the market for complementary products or
services that alter the rendering of the copyrighted content. See Motion Picture Studio
Defendants' Response Brief in Opposition to Clearplay, Inc.'s, Trilogy Studios, Inc.'s, and
Family Shield Techs., LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Huntsman v. Soderburgh, No.
Civ.A02CV01662, 2005 WL 1993421 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Huntsman_v_Soderbergh/response andappendix.pdf
(discussing derivative work issues posed by add-on software that alters the rendering of
1870 [Vol. 74
THE GENERA TIVITY OF SONY V. UNIVERSAL
a computer program, known as the "Game Genie," that allowed owners of
copies of Nintendo games to use it in conjunction with the Nintendo games
to make some changes in the play of the games, for example, by
"extending" the life of a favored character. Nintendo claimed that the
changed play of its games created infringing derivative works and that
Galoob was liable for infringement for knowingly contributing to this
infringement. Galoob sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.
Because the Game Genie did not permanently change the play of the
Nintendo games, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether its use actually
created a derivative work,308 but even if it did, the court ruled that use of
the Game Genie qualified as a fair use.309 Nintendo characterized Galoob's
purpose in selling the Game Genie as commercial, a factor weighing against
fair use, but the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the Court in Sony had
directed courts to consider the purpose of individuals engaged in time
shifting Betamax machines, so the proper focus was on the purpose of users
of the Game Genie, which was, as in Sony, private and noncommercial. 310
The court invoked Sony's presumption of fairness for private
noncommercial activities, such as time-shift copying or using the Game
Genie in the privacy of one's home.311 Nintendo sought to distinguish Sony
because it involved copying of copyrighted works, not the making of
derivative works:
[T]he consumers in Sony could lawfully copy the copyrighted works
because they were invited to view those works free of charge. Game
Genie users, in contrast, are not invited to view derivative works based on
Nintendo's copyrighted works without first paying for that privilege.
Sony cannot be read so narrowly. It is difficult to imagine that the Court
would have reached a different conclusion if Betamax purchasers were
skipping portions of copyrighted works or viewing denouements before
climaxes. Sony recognizes that a party who distributes a copyrighted
work cannot dictate how that work is to be enjoyed. Consumers may use a
Betamax to view copyrighted works at a more convenient time. They
similarly may use a Game Genie to enhance a Nintendo Game cartridge's
audiovisual display in such a way as to make the experience more
enjoyable.3 12
Nintendo's claim that the Game Genie displaced a potential market for
altered games did not persuade the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit agreed
copyrighted movies); see also Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and
Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1
J. Intell. Prop. L. 49 (1993) (discussing the implications of Galoob for digital enhancement
tools).
308. Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968-69.
309. Id. at 970-72.
310. Id. at 970.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 971.
2006] 1871
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
with the trial court that Nintendo had failed to show, as Sony required, a
meaningful likelihood of present or future harm. 313
Huntsman v. Soderbergh314 was a similar lawsuit to test the lawfulness of
add-on software enabling individuals who had purchased or rented DVD
movies to watch them in a way that enhanced the family viewing
experience. 315 Huntsman was a principal in one of the software companies
that created programs to allow users to skip or mute scenes depicting sex,
nudity, violence, and/or profane language. Huntsman, his firm, and
developers of similar technologies asked for a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement on trademark and copyright claims being made by director
Steven Soderbergh, the Directors Guild, and major movie studios.
Huntsman viewed Galoob and Sony as two precedents strongly supporting
his claim of noninfringement. 316 Before this lawsuit could proceed to
judgment, Congress amended the copyright statute to permit development
and distribution of such technologies. 317 As in Sony and Galoob, this law
protects the autonomy interests of individuals in being able to control their
experience as viewers of copyrighted content in the privacy of their homes.
H. Internet Service and Access Providers
The Sony decision did not contemplate what impact digital technologies
and the Internet might have on copyright owners, but its framework for
analysis has been influential in a number of cases involving Internet service
and access providers. Prior to enactment of the DMCA, 318 there was
considerable uncertainty about the copyright liability of Internet service
(and access) providers ("ISPs"). The Clinton Administration asserted that
ISPs were directly and appropriately liable for the transmission of
infringing files between users because of the temporary copies of
copyrighted works made in the random access memory ("RAM") of ISP
computers in the course of transmission, as well as for infringing copies
stored on ISP computers in individual user accounts, even those of which
ISPs were ignorant.319 The Clinton Administration's interpretation of
copyright law would also have regarded as infringement caching of
copyrighted digital content that an ISP obtained from external websites to
ensure speedier access to popular websites for their customers.
313. Id. at 972.
314. No. Civ.A02CV01662, 2005 WL 1993421 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005).
315. Copies of legal briefs from this case are available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Huntsman_vSoderbergh/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
316. See The Player Control Parties' Corrected Opening Brief In Support of Their Motion
for Summary Judgment, Huntsman, No. Civ.A02CVO 1662, 2005 WL 1993421, available at
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Huntsman_vSoderbergh/20030617_support-sumj.pdf.
317. See Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat.
218.
318. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)).
319. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Report of the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure 114-24 (1995).
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Telecommunications providers and ISPs argued that they were not and
should not be liable for infringing transmissions, for infringing files of
which they were ignorant, or for caching files from publicly accessible
websites. Sony was the principal opinion supporting the telecomlISPs'
position. Caching, for example, may involve the copying of entire works,
but Sony made clear that this did not necessarily disqualify a use from being
fair. The content being cached had been made available on the Internet
without charge, like the broadcast programs in Sony. Cached copies
enabled personal uses of this content, akin to the time-shifted access in
Sony. There was, moreover, little likelihood of harm to the market for
content posted on the open Internet. To forbid caching as a copyright
infringement would, as in Sony, "merely inhibit access to ideas without any
countervailing benefit. ' '320
ISPs charged with direct infringement for activities of this sort have
invoked Sony as a precedent for holding that non-volitional copying such as
automatic copying of digital content transmitted via the Internet should not
be infringement. In CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc.,321 for instance, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected CoStar's
direct infringement claim, saying,
While the Copyright Act does not require that the infringer know that
he is infringing or that his conduct amount to a willful violation of the
copyright owner's rights, it nonetheless requires conduct by a person who
causes in some meaningful way an infringement. Were this not so, the
Supreme Court could not have held, as it did in Sony, that a manufacturer
of copy machines, possessing constructive knowledge that purchasers of
its machine may be using them to engage in copyright infringement, is not
strictly liable for infringement. 322
ISPs can, of course, be held indirectly liable for contributory or vicarious
infringement, but liability under these theories "would require a showing of
additional elements such as knowledge coupled with inducement or
supervision coupled with a financial interest in the illegal copying. '323 The
court concluded that the DMCA safe harbors protect ISPs from both direct
and indirect liability unless they fail to comply with safe harbor
requirements. 324 The DMCA sets forth requirements about the notice that
must be given to ISPs in order to put them under an obligation to
investigate infringing materials stored on their systems. 325
320. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); see
Field v. Google Inc., No. CV-S-04-0413, 2006 WL 242465 (D. Nev. Jan. 19, 2006) (holding
that a search engine's caching of digital works posted on websites was fair use).
321. 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
322. Id. at 549 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439-42).
323. Id.
324. Conditions for eligibility for the safe harbor are set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)
(2000).
325. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
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I. Search Engines
Sony has also been an important precedent in cases considering liability
of search engines that, like ISPs, make digital copies of copyrighted content
available on the Internet. Search engines do so in the course of "spidering"
the 'net in order to prepare indexes or otherwise facilitate users' access to
content for which they are searching. The DMCA creates another safe
harbor for search engines and other information-locating tools, which is
subject, as with caching and storage of user information, to requirements
that such tools block access to infringing materials upon receiving proper
notice of illicit content. 326 This DMCA safe harbor for search engines is
consistent with Justice Stevens's decision in Sony.
The maker of a specialized search engine for images was challenged as a
direct infringer in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.327 because it made thumbnail
size copies of digital images posted on the Internet, including those of
Kelly, a commercial photographer. Arriba sent a web-crawler onto the web
to look for images to index. The crawler downloaded full-sized copies of
the images onto Arriba's server and used these copies to generate smaller,
lower-resolution thumbnails of the images. 328  After creating the
thumbnails, the full-sized originals were deleted from Arriba's server. A
user of Arriba's search engine could copy the thumbnails onto his
computer, but could not increase the resolution of the thumbnail.
Kelly responded to Arriba's fair use defense by emphasizing, as Justice
Blackmun would have, Arriba's commercial purpose in making the
thumbnail copies, the nonproductive character of the thumbnails, the
copying of the whole of each image, and Arriba's interference with a
potential market for Kelly's work, namely, licensing the right to make such
copies by search engines. 329 The Ninth Circuit held, consistent with Sony,
that Arriba had made fair use of the digital images. Although it did not
directly invoke Sony, its fair use analysis was consistent with Justice
Stevens's opinion in that case.330 The thumbnail images had, the court
ruled, a different function than the images on Kelly's site and improved
public access to them. 331 This copying did not stifle creativity or displace
the market for Kelly's images; indeed, the thumbnail images made it more
likely that users would go to Kelly's site and purchase rights to use his
images. 332 Arriba may have copied the whole image, but given the
326. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
327. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
328. The direct infringement claim was not based on the copying of the images by the
webcrawling program, but only on the reproductions that were visible to users of Arriba's
search engine.
329. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819-22. Kelly's argument against fair use in this case was
patterned after Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony.
330. The Ninth Circuit did, however, rely, in part, on Sony Computer Entertainment
America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000), which, in turn, had relied upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Sony. See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
331. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819-20.
332. Id. at 820-21.
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necessity of doing so to facilitate access, this factor did not cause the use to
be unfair.333 Justice Stevens's analytic framework in Sony, it seems,
sometimes has influence, even when the decision is not directly cited.
CONCLUSION
Of the nearly fifty IP decisions rendered by the Supreme Court during the
thirty years that Justice Stevens has served on the Court, none has had a
more significant economic or social impact than Sony v. Universal. Had
Justice Stevens written no other opinion for the Court than this, he would be
rightly remembered for the insightful and generative decision he wrote in
Sony.
With the benefit of twenty years of experience, Justice Stevens's decision
in Sony seems remarkably prescient. Not only did it pave the way for the
untrammeled introduction into the market of iPods, MP3 players, digital
video recorders, CD ripping software, CD burners, p2p technologies, and
many others, but confirmed that use of such technologies for private and
noncommercial purposes generally does not harm the interests of copyright
owners. The Sony decision helped to promote competition and ongoing
innovation in the computer software industry by providing guidance to
courts that ruled that unlicensed software developers could reverse engineer
computer software for purposes of achieving interoperability among
programs. Add-on software that enhances the experience of users of digital
information products also has benefited from the framework for analysis
provided by Justice Stevens's decision in Sony.
But perhaps the most important impacts of Sony have been in mitigating
the significance of "non-transformative" copying of whole works made
routinely in today's digital networked environments. It is impossible to
access or use copyrighted works in digital form without making incidental
copies of them. Courts have recognized that to construe each incidental
copy as infringement would stretch copyright law too far. ISPs, the Internet
Archive, and Google would have little hope of making plausible fair use
arguments for digital copying of many millions of copies of copyrighted
works without Sony's framework of analysis.
The stark differences between the analytical frameworks of Justices
Stevens and Blackmun in Sony have continued to play themselves out in the
major copyright controversies of the day. Texaco and MP3.com are
examples of decisions in which a Blackmun-style high protectionist
analysis prevailed, while Sega and Kelly show that a Stevens-like low
protectionist analysis has considerable vitality as well.
The rise of global digital networks and advances in the development of
information technologies permitting creative uses and reuses of copyrighted
content will almost certainly continue to pose difficult questions for the
courts and for legislatures. Sony provides meaningful guidance about how
333. Id. at 821-22.
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copyright law should be construed when new technologies pose questions
that the legislatures have not anticipated and case law does not readily
provide clear answers. In the IP field, this legacy of Justice Stevens is
worth celebrating as part of the Fordham symposium.
